Accident scenario analysis for maritime operations by Baksh, MA
Accident Scenario Analysis for Maritime 
Operations
by 
Md. Al-Amin Baksh, MSc (Computational Science), BSc (Statistics) 
National Centre for Maritime Engineering and Hydrodynamics 
Australian Maritime College 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Tasmania 
March 2018 
ii 
Declarations 
Authority of Access 
The publishers of the papers comprising Chapters 2 – 4 hold the copyright for that 
content, and access to the material should be sought from the respective journals. The 
remaining non-published content of this thesis may be made available for loan and 
limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. 
Declaration of Originality 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by 
the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and 
duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no 
material previously published or written by another person except where due 
acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any 
material that infringes copyright. 
Signed:   Date:   23 March 2018 
Md. Al-Amin Baksh 
iii 
Statement of Co-Authorship 
The following people and institutions contributed to the publication of work 
undertaken as part of this thesis: 
Md. Al-Amin Baksh, Australian Maritime College 
Prof Faisal Khan, Primary Supervisor, Australian Maritime College 
Dr Vikram Garaniya, Co-Supervisor, Australian Maritime College 
Dr Rouzbeh Abbassi, Co-Supervisor, Australian Maritime College 
Paper 1 (Chapter 2): A Network Based Approach to Envisage Potential Accidents 
in Offshore Process Facilities.  
Al-Amin Baksh was the primary author and with Faisal Khan, Vikram Garaniya, and 
Rouzbeh Abbassi contributed to the conception and design of the research project and 
drafted significant parts of the paper. 
Percentage of Contribution: Candidate 70%, Faisal Khan 12%, Vikram Garaniya 8%, 
Rouzbeh Abbassi 10%.  
Paper 2 (Chapter 3): Marine Transportation Risk Assessment Using Bayesian 
Network: Application to Arctic Waters. 
Al-Amin Baksh was the primary author and with Faisal Khan, Vikram Garaniya, and 
Rouzbeh Abbassi contributed to the conception and design of the research project and 
drafted significant parts of the paper. 
Percentage of Contribution: Candidate 70%, Faisal Khan 10%, Vikram Garaniya 8%, 
Rouzbeh Abbassi 12%.  
Paper 3 (Chapter 4): Dynamic Risk Model for Marine Vessel Collision Avoidance 
in Narrow Channel. 
Al-Amin Baksh was the primary author and with Faisal Khan, Vikram Garaniya, and 
Rouzbeh Abbassi contributed to the conception and design of the research project and 
drafted significant parts of the paper. 
Percentage of Contribution: Candidate 70%, Faisal Khan 12%, Vikram Garaniya 8%, 
Rouzbeh Abbassi 10%. 
iv 
We the undersigned agree with the above stated “proportion of work undertaken” for 
each of the above published (or submitted) peer-reviewed manuscripts contributing to 
this thesis: 
Signed: 
Prof Faisal Khan 
Primary Supervisor 
Centre for Risk, Integrity and Safety 
Engineering (C-RISE) 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
Dr Vikram Garaniya 
Co-Supervisor 
National Centre for Maritime Engineering 
and Hydrodynamics (NCMEH) 
University of Tasmania 
Date: 23/03/2018 Date: 23/03/2018 
Dr Rouzbeh Abbassi 
Co-Supervisor 
National Centre for Maritime 
Engineering and Hydrodynamics 
(NCMEH) 
University of Tasmania 
Date: 23/03/2018 
v 
Acknowledgements 
Peace be upon you all. I would like to thank the Almighty God for giving me the time 
and the strength and enabling me to complete this work.  
To help me on this collision free journey, I have had three excellent navigator Professor 
Faisal Khan, Dr Vikram Garaniya and Dr Rouzbeh Abbassi at Australian Maritime 
College. A special thanks to my primary supervisor, Professor Faisal Khan, for the 
opportunity to conduct this research and for all his inspiration, support and guidance. 
I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr Vikram Garaniya from NCMEH for 
his advice and excellent guidance. I also thank Dr Rouzbeh Abbassi for working with 
me on every step of my research through his kind support and encouragement.  
Thanks to my colleagues at the AMC, friends and family for invaluable help and 
support. Special thanks to Mahdi Abei and Dr Nagi Abdussamie for several inspiring 
discussions and suggestions. 
Last but not the least, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my beloved 
wife, Emi, who has been supporting and encouraging me all the time.   
This research project was financially supported by the NCMEH and this support is 
gratefully acknowledged. I also thank the Graduate Research at the University of 
Tasmania, for their financial and relevant support.   
vi 
Abstract 
Over the years, there has been a significant increase in both size and complexity of 
processes in marine and offshore operations. One example of maritime operations is 
that of large-scale Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) processing facilities. 
Accidents in such facilities can be very complex and would be best characterised by 
evolving scenarios. This thesis reports on the development of a new methodology to 
incorporate evolving scenarios in a single model and predicts the likelihood of an 
accident. The methodology comprises; (a) evolving scenario identification, (b) 
accident consequence framework development, (c) accident scenario likelihood 
estimation, and (d) ranking of the scenarios. Resulting events in the present work are 
modelled using a Bayesian Network (BN) approach, which represents accident 
scenarios as cause-consequences networks. The methodology developed in this thesis 
is compared with case studies of ammonia and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from 
chemical and offshore process facility, respectively. The proposed method can 
differentiate the consequence of specific events and predict probabilities for such 
events along with continual updating of the consequence probabilities of fire and 
explosion scenarios being taken into account. The developed methodology can be used 
to envisage evolving scenarios that occur in the offshore oil and gas processing 
industry. However, with further modification, it can be applied to different sections of 
marine industry to predict the likelihood of such accidents. 
Maritime transportation poses risks regarding possible accidents resulting in damage 
to vessels, crew members and to the ecosystem. The safe navigation of ships, especially 
in Arctic waters, is a growing concern to maritime authorities. This study proposes a 
new risk model to investigate the possibility of marine accidents such as collision, 
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foundering and grounding. The model is developed using the BN. The proposed risk 
model has considered different operational and environmental factors that affect 
shipping operations. The application of the model is demonstrated through a case study 
of an oil-tanker navigating the Northern Sea Route (NSR). By running uncertainty and 
sensitivity analyses of the model, a significant change in the likelihood of the 
occurrence of accidental events is identified. The model suggests ice effect as a 
dominant factor in accident causation. The case study illustrates the priority of the 
model in investigating the operational risk of accidents. The developed methodology 
can be used to investigate the possibility of preventing and mitigating ship accidents 
in harsh and cold environments.   
Collision avoidance in narrow channel is critical if no early warning is provided. In 
this thesis, a dynamic risk management system is proposed for the marine vessel so 
that it can be useful by warning the operator of a vessel of a potential collision threat 
while travelling along narrow trafficway. This model estimates the level of risk by 
taking into consideration vessel kinematics, different operational and environmental 
factors as well as human factors in a confined area and provides early warning. Five 
decision-making skills viz. general skills, management training, technical knowledge, 
emergency skills and sailing experience are employed as requirements in an 
emergency. The applicability of the proposed methodology has been demonstrated 
through two case scenarios in a narrow channel. The probability obtained through the 
proposed methodology can be used to make a real-time decision, such as situation 
assessment, appropriate and immediate action followed by the evasive action. The 
simulated result shows the increasing level of risk as the probability of warning level 
increases. Similarly, lower risk decreases as the situation crosses that threshold. The 
viii 
estimated risk allows early warning to take appropriate preventive and mitigative 
measures to avoid a collision and thus enhance the overall safety of shipping 
operations.   
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
1.1.   Background 
Maritime operations are very difficult to make completely safe and risk free. Accidents 
can expose ship owners and operators, as well as the public, to risk. The nature of an 
accident can be troublesome as the consequences may lead to loss of life, structural 
failure, serious injuries to people, disruption of operation and damage to the 
environment. In marine systems there are two types of objects; moving (e.g., ships and 
boats) and fixed (e.g., offshore oil and gas platform and wind farms). Therefore, major 
marine and offshore accidents can be categorised into three groupings, such as 
collision between (i) moving to moving object, (ii) moving to fixed object, and (iii) 
other accidents (e.g., grounding, capsizing, fire and explosion and structural failure). 
Marine accident model of these three types of accident is shown in Figure 1–1. 
Moving to 
moving
Marine 
accidents
Moving to 
fixed
Other 
accident
Collision
CapsizingGrounding
Fire and 
explosion
Structual 
failure
Moving object
(Ships and Boats)
Offshore wind 
farms
Offshore oil & 
gas platform
Marine 
system
Fixed
object
 
Figure 1–1: Marine system and type of accidents. 
 
Ship to ship collision or collision with a fixed object such as an offshore platform can 
be catastrophic. Collision can lead to fire and explosion and as a result, grounding and 
capsizing could happen. According to Bottelberghs (1995), marine accidents fall under 
the scenarios of collision, fire and explosion, flooding, and grounding. Figure 1–2 
illustrates the four types of marine accidents, viz. (i) fire and explosion, (ii) collision, 
(iii) capsizing and, (iv) grounding.   
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Figure 1–2: Four different types of marine accidents. 
According to the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada (TSB, 2017), the most 
frequent types of shipping accidents in 2016 were fire/explosion accidents (17%), 
collisions (33%), and groundings (25%), as illustrated in Figure 1–3. The total number 
of ship collisions increased by 12% from the five-year average (2011-2015) from 78 
to 87 in 2016. Similarly, fire/explosion accidents increased by 24% from the five-year 
average from 35 to 44 in 2016. 
 
Figure 1–3: Marine shipping accidents (2007-2016). 
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Human error effect is recognised as one of the recurrent causal factors for marine ship 
collision. According to an MAIB (2004) report, the most common contributory factors 
in 33 collisions that happened during the period 1994-2003 were poor lookout (65%) 
and poor use of radar (73%).The International maritime organization (IMO) has made 
significant efforts to promote safety at sea in the marine shipping industry (O’Neil, 
2003). However, a large number of accidents occur every year needing attention and 
lessons need to be learnt from past marine accidents (Uğurlu, 2011). Environmental 
protection agencies are now concerned about protecting the marine environment by 
promoting awareness to marine casuals and people associated with marine businesses. 
1.2.   Problem statement 
The risk of fire and explosion due to a major or minor accident is very common in 
offshore operations. In offshore industry, processing accidents such as fire and 
explosion are often caused by equipment malfunction, process deviation, structural 
failure, and human error (Pula et al., 2005). Inadequate control of these factors can 
lead to an increase in the incidence of industrial accidents. There is a lack of knowledge 
to incorporate evolving scenarios in a single model and predict the likelihood of an 
accident (e.g., fire and explosion). In a processing accident, minor or severe damages 
can cause fatalities, financial loss as well as environment damages. Besides damages, 
it is necessary to identify any probable accident event, the magnitude of damages and 
its impact on the environment to estimate and envisage prospective losses. Hence, 
identification and ranking of potential damages are needed to ensure maximum safety.  
 
The Northern transport corridor, known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic 
region, is one of the potential trade routes connecting major Asian and European ports. 
The presence of sea ice, extremely low temperatures and drifting icebergs has made 
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this region mostly inaccessible for marine transportation and poses threats to mariners 
and the current ship technologies (Ellis and Brigham, 2009). Previous studies confirm 
that increasing traffic of oil tankers in the Barents Sea will result in a significant 
number of accidents if further maritime safety measures are not attained (NME, 2011). 
The safe navigation of ships, especially in the Arctic waters, is of growing concern to 
maritime authorities. However, limited research has been conducted on the effect of 
both cold and harsh environmental conditions on shipping accidents in this region. 
Integrated accident models based on different types of accidents for the NSR are quite 
limited. Recorded data of wave height and wind speed for the NSR have never been 
considered in the literature or accident analysis. Thus, conventional ship accident 
models developed for Arctic regions may not address the integrated accident events 
such as ice-ship collision, foundering and grounding, simultaneously considering 
recorded data of five sea states.  
 
Collision avoidance is an essential task for any transportation system as well as in 
many other applications. A marine vessel needs to maintain safe distance in open water 
as well as in a confined channel. In the presence of a stationary or non-stationary 
vessel/object a vessel needs to react immediately to avoid a potential collision and it 
would be alarming if no early warning was provided. Marine vessels are equipped with 
the latest radar system; however, they lack the latest sensors, similar to an auto vehicle 
to receive similar support in a confined area where vessels battle for room to 
manoeuvre safely. There is a need for a dynamic risk-based model to predict the level 
of risk and take effective action in real-time considering vessel kinematics, operational 
and environmental conditions as well as human factors. Thus, conventional collision 
alert models developed for confined areas may not address the criteria discussed above. 
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1.3.   Knowledge and technical gaps 
Marine and offshore accidents can lead to evolving scenarios, such as gas leakage 
which may result in a vapor cloud explosion (VCE), jet fire, pool fire, fireball and 
boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). Previous studies by Kim and 
Salvesen (2002), Koo et al. (2009) and Skarsbo (2011) limit focus on individual fire 
and/or explosion modelling, ignoring evolving scenarios. However, a potential pool 
fire scenario is completely ignored (Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b). Another study by Koo 
et al. (2009) on an LNG terminal focused on pool fire modelling. Hence, no 
consideration was given to VCE or other possible interactions such as jet fire 
(Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b). Fire and explosion accident scenario analysis can be 
ranked according to their credibility to identify the most hazardous event. Literature 
review on accident hazard index has shown that identification and ranking of process 
hazards mostly focus on Dow Index (Dow, 1967-87; Scheffler, 1994), Mond Index 
(GDG, 1970-85), Toxicity Index (Tyler et al., 1995) and accident hazard index referred 
to as HIRA (Hazard Identification and Ranking) by Khan and Abbasi (1997). These 
hazard indices are limited to only industrial sites ignoring surrounding population, 
environment and assets yet, these indices have a strong influence on deciding adverse 
impacts caused by a potential accident. Christen et al. (1994) took an initiative to rank 
the severity of past accidents on a scale of 0-1 without envisaging the damage potential 
from similar types of accident in different premises. This ranking scale was considered 
as the most advanced approach by Khan and Abbasi (1997) though site specific 
attributes were not considered during the operation of this scale. Keller et al. (1985) 
and Wyler and Bohnenblust (1991) also recommended a rank-based system to rank 
past accidents yet forecasting of similar types of accident was overlooked. After 
reviewing above mentioned approaches, Khan and Abbasi (1997), proposed accident 
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hazard index (AHI) that characterized accident consequences on a standard scale of 1-
10. It overcame past limitations by incorporating different direct impact parameters 
such as surrounding population, asset, ecosystem and indirect impact of different 
environmental media such as soil, water and air to the model. However, the AHI 
method is not able to model the evolving scenarios rather it considers individual 
consequences and ranks them based on their credibility. 
 
In maritime risk and consequence assessment, several methods have been applied to 
estimate the causation probability of shipping accidents. Fujii and Shiobara (1971) 
introduced one of the most common approaches to estimate the number of ship 
collisions, where the number of collisions is calculated as a product of the number of 
geometrical collision candidates and a causation probability. Macduff (1974) initially 
proposed a ship collision and grounding model based on available historical accident 
records. However, it lacked a clear understanding of accident causes. Risk analysis 
tools such as fault trees were developed to estimate the causation probability of 
collision events (Pedersen, 1995; Rosqvist et al., 2002). Marine Accident Risk 
Calculation System (MARCS) was also developed based on fault tree analysis while 
considering major shipping accidents such as collisions, powered grounding, drift 
grounding, foundering and fire and explosions by Fowler and Sørgård (2000). Danish 
institution COWI (2008) proposed formal safety assessment (FSA) methodology for 
sea traffic taking into account collisions and groundings. Martins and Maturana (2010) 
applied fault tree analysis to assess the collision and grounding probability using FSA 
method. Zaman et al. (2014) estimated the risk of collision in the Malacca Strait using 
the FSA approach. Merrick et al. (2000) developed a Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) technique considering expert judgment to assess the accident risk in the Prince 
7 
 
William Sound. Van Dorp et al. (2001) developed maritime accident event chain which 
included collision, grounding and fire/explosion using available data combined with 
expert judgment. Montewka et al. (2010) proposed a geometrical model to assess the 
likelihood of ship collisions. A collision probability model based on Monte Carlo 
simulation technique was developed by Goerlandt and Kujala (2011). Later, it was 
used in evaluating the risk of tanker collisions in the Gulf of Finland (Goerlandt et al., 
2011). a probabilistic approach was proposed to assess the risk and sustainability 
associated with ship collision by Dong and Frangopol (2014). Goerlandt et al. (2015) 
developed a ship collision alert system to measure ship collision risk based on fuzzy 
approach and expert elicitation. Banda et al. (2015) visualised the accident risks 
through a hazard identification model in the Finnish-Swedish winter navigation 
system. Sormunen et al. (2015) investigated chemical tanker collision as a case study 
by taking into account data uncertainties. Montewka et al. (2014) proposed BN 
framework for ship-ship collisions in the open sea, evaluated the probabilities of these 
events and finally, determined the severity of a collision. Goerlandt and Montewka 
(2015) developed a Bayesian network model and applied it to a case study of the oil 
spill from a tanker to quantify the risk. Mazaheri et al. (2016) proposed an evidence-
based and expert-supported Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) for assessing the 
probability of ship-grounding accidents. Fu et al. (2016) developed a causal 
probabilistic model to predict the probability of a ship stuck in ice in the Arctic waters 
using the BBNs. In this causal model, a set of input parameters, such as hydro-
meteorological conditions (air temperature, ice concentration, ice thickness, sea 
temperature, wave height and wind speed), along the analysed route were considered. 
Khan et al. (2017) proposed an Object-Oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN) model to 
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predict ship-ice collision probability considering navigational, operational and human 
factors.  
 
Among ship accidents, ship-ship collision has been the focus of many related studies 
in recent years (Goerlandt et al., 2015; Goerlandt et al., 2012a; Montewka et al., 2011a; 
Montewka et al., 2012; Montewka et al., 2011b; Montewka et al., 2010; Qu et al., 
2011). Fujii et al. (1970) and Macduff (1974) used the concept of collision diameter 
which is defined as the contact of two vessels at a distance (Pedersen, 1995). Gluver 
and Olsen (1998) utilised ship domain approach to assess ship to fixed object collision. 
Fowler and Sørgård (2000) used the critical situation criteria, defined as a close 
encounter of two vessels within a certain distance. Tran et al. (2002) developed a 
unified collision avoidance system for marine operation called MANTIS. Kaneko 
(2002) proposed a collision model to encounter probability estimation which, defines 
a critical area in a rectangular and circular shape around a vessel with violation of that 
area meaning a collision. Pedersen (2002) published a series of papers based on 
collision assessment of a ship to a fixed object. Montewka et al. (2010) proposed the 
MDTC (Minimum Distance to Collision) geometrical model for the ship to ship 
collision probability estimation. Mou et al. (2010) established a risk assessment model 
and used the automatic identification system (AIS) data to study collision avoidance 
in busy waterways by taking into consideration ship collision data. Qu et al. (2011) 
studied ship collision risks in the Singapore Strait by considering real-time ship 
location and vessel speed. Montewka et al. (2011a) defined a critical situation as a 
close encounter of two vessels within a distance of 0.5 Nm and considered this value 
as constant, regardless of any contact between those two vessels. The Airborne 
Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) was already introduced in (Baldauf et al., 2014; 
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Baldauf et al., 2015) for maritime domain. Further this method was extended as 
Maritime Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (MTCAS) in (Baldauf et al., 
2017; Denker et al., 2016). According to Baldauf et al. (2017), to trigger a perfect 
collision alarm very much needed a comprehensive network of sensors to provide 
accurate and reliable data of own vessel, marine environment and targets in the 
vicinity. Szlapczynski and Szlapczynska (2017) presented a Collision Threat 
Parameters Area (CTPA) display based technique featuring a manoeuvre simulation 
mode to assist the navigator in advance to see the results of a planned manoeuvre 
(combinations of own course and speed with respect to time as well as target-colliding 
and landmass-colliding). Szlapczynski and Krata (2018) further extended the method 
by utilising detailed modelling of own ship dynamics viz. course alteration manoeuvres 
and supports navigation for harsh weather conditions. 
 
Based on the challenges remaining in the problem of fire and explosion modelling for 
marine and offshore structures, integrated accident model for the NSR and the collision 
avoidance in narrow channel discussed above, the following research gaps have been 
identified: 
• Previous studies are limited to individual fire and/or explosion modeling, 
ignoring evolving scenarios. 
• Most credible accident scenarios are not ranked in most studies. 
• An up to date consequence modelling framework needs to be developed to 
address fire and explosion consequences based on release condition (primary 
causes). 
• Integrated accident models based on different types of accidents for the cold 
region such as NSR are quite limited.  
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• Recorded data of wave height and wind speed for the NSR are not available in 
present literature and have never been considered for accident analysis where 
appropriate. 
• Collision alert system for marine vessel, similar to an auto vehicle, would be 
an updated approach for marine industry to detect potential hazard in narrow 
channel and hence couple decision-making skills. 
• Use of OOBN are limited to address complex network available for collision 
alert systems 
• Conventional risk analysis approaches are mostly used to identify potential 
causes and consequences. 
1.4.   Research objectives  
This work aims at a better understanding of the problem of marine process accidents 
in processing facility and transportation accidents in open sea and in narrow channel. 
The specific research objectives of this work are: 
1. to achieve an in-depth understanding of evolving scenarios in marine and 
offshore operations; 
2. to develop a novel dynamic accident model applicable to cold environment; 
3. to develop a novel model to integrate potential accidents applicable in maritime 
operations; and 
4. to demonstrate the application of the developed approaches and methodologies 
through illustrative examples or case studies. 
1.5.   Research questions  
The research questions answered by this work are: 
11 
 
1. How to quantify what can go wrong in any marine and offshore operation 
considering process and transportation accidents? 
2. How to develop a dynamic accident model for marine and offshore opeartions? 
3. How to adopt a probabilistic approach for marine uncertainty data analysis? 
4. How to demonstrate the accident model in real-life example? 
5. How to integrate different type of marine transportation accidents in a single 
combined model? 
1.6.   Novelty and contribution 
Following contribution has been made in this research: 
• An integrated fire and explosion model is developed to address evolving 
scenarios and identify the most credible scenarios and rank them accordingly.  
• An up to date consequence modelling framework is developed applicable to 
fire and explosion events. 
• An integrated dynamic risk model is developed for the cold region.  
• A dynamic collision alert system, marine collision avoidance risk (MCAR), is 
developed for the narrow channel. 
1.7.   Scope and limitations of the study 
The scope of this study was limited to investigating marine process accidents in 
processing facility and transportation accidents in open sea and in narrow channel. In 
the first part of the work, literature review of different marine and offshore accidents 
is performed. During the literature review, accident models applicable to marine and 
offshore accidents are considered. In the first part of the work, emphasis is given to 
fire and explosion consequences. In the second part of the work, emphasis is given to 
ship accidents such as collision, foundering and grounding in the Arctic region. A 
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dynamic risk-based model is developed to integrate these accidents into a single 
combined model. In the final part of the work, emphasis is given to collision alert 
system applicable in narrow channel.   
 
The overall objectives and associated tasks are listed in Figure 1–4. 
To understand 
marine accidents and 
evolving scenarios 
and primary causes 
of the accident
To develop a novel 
dynamic accident 
model for maritime 
operations
To demonstrate the 
Application of the 
developed 
approaches
Accident Scenario 
Analysis for 
Maritime 
Operations
Develop a novel cause-consequence accident model for 
fire and explosion scenarios
Develop a novel consequence modelling framework to 
incorporate cause and consequences (fire and explosion)
Develop a novel dynamic marine accident model 
applicable for the cold region
Develop a novel dynamic risk accident model for 
collision avoidance in narrow channel 
To develop a novel 
model to integrate 
potential accidents
Select primary causes than can affect the accident 
consequences
Identify different type of accidents and evolving scenarios
Data collection; SMEs judgment on defining probability
Develop a novel integrated model for process operations
Develop a novel integrated model for maritime operations
Demonstrate the cause-consequence model in evolving 
scenarios and rank the most credible scenarios
Demonstrate the integrated accident model for marine 
operations in the cold region
Demonstrate the collision avoidance system for marine 
operations in narrow channel
Generate results and perform sensitivity analysis to 
assess the sensitivity of the most critical BN nodes 
 
Figure 1–4: Objectives and associated tasks of this research. 
 
1.8.   Thesis organisation  
This thesis is comprised of three main chapters compiled from two journal articles that 
have been accepted for publication and one other article currently under review. The 
relevant publishing details are given at the beginning of each chapter. A flowchart of 
the research conducted during this PhD study is presented in Figure 1–5. 
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Accident Scenario Analysis for 
Maritime Operations
Introduction
(Chapter 1)
Cause-Consequence 
Accident Model
(Chapter 2)
Transportation Accident 
model
(Chapter 3)
In Open Sea
(Chapter 3)
In Narrow Channel
(Chapter 4)
 
Figure 1–5: A flowchart showing thesis organisation. 
 
An outline of each chapter is presented below. 
• Chapter 2 emphasises cause-impact accident model and describes the 
integration of accident consequences and the potential outcome through 
accident case scenarios. Research objectives 1 – 4 are addressed in this 
chapter. 
• Chapter 3 emphasises marine transportation risk in Arctic waters. This 
chapter presents a dynamic risk-based model to analyse shipping 
accidents in Arctic waters to reduce the risk of accidents considering 
particular environmental and operational conditions. Research 
objectives 1 – 4 are addressed in this chapter. 
• Chapter 4 focuses on a collision avoidance model only applicable in a 
narrow channel to estimate the level of risk and hence, real-time 
decision making in the presence of stationary and non-stationary 
objects en-route. Research objectives 1 – 2 and 4 are addressed in this 
chapter.   
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• Chapter 5 presents the main research conclusions of this study and 
recommendations for future work.  
• Appendix A illustrates a peer-reviewed conference paper submitted to 
the 12th International Offshore and Polar Engineering (ISOPE) 
Pacific/Asia Offshore Mechanics Symposium (PACOMS). The paper 
presents a probabilistic approach to foresee the most probable accident 
scenario in complex offshore processing facilities by considering the 
evidence of primary causes. 
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Chapter 2:   A network based approach to 
envisage potentials accidents in offshore 
process facilities 
 
This work presented in this chapter has been published in the journal of Process Safety 
Progress. The paper has been edited for inclusion into this thesis to improve 
readability. The citation for this research article is: 
Baksh, A.-A, Abbassi, R., Garaniya, V. and Khan, F. (2017). A network based 
approach to envisage potential accidents in offshore process facilities. Process Safety 
Progress. 36: 178-191. DOI:10.1002/prs.11854. 
Abstract 
Envisaging potential accidents in large scale offshore process facilities such as 
Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) is complex and could be best characterized 
through evolving scenarios. In the present work, a new methodology is developed to 
incorporate evolving scenarios in a single model and predicts the likelihood of 
accident. The methodology comprises; a) evolving scenario identification, b) accident 
consequence framework development, c) accident scenario likelihood estimation, and 
d) ranking of the scenarios. Resulting events in the present work are modelled using a 
Bayesian network approach, which represents accident scenarios as cause-
consequences networks. The methodology developed in this article is compared with 
case studies of ammonia and Liquefied Natural Gas from chemical and offshore 
process facility respectively. The proposed method is able to differentiate the 
consequence of specific events and predict probabilities for such events along with 
continual updating of consequence probabilities of fire and explosion scenarios taking 
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into account. The developed methodology can be used to envisage evolving scenarios 
that occur in the offshore oil and gas process industry; however, with further 
modification it can be applied to different sections of marine industry to predict the 
likelihood of such accidents. 
2.1.   Introduction 
FLNG is the most recent addition to floating process facilities which is dynamic in 
nature and can be characterized by complex subsystems, distributed processes, 
uncertainty and a high degree of automation. Chemicals or hydrocarbon release from 
these facilities can escalate to catastrophic events which may result in casualties and 
significant damages to the environment and coastal marine ecosystems (HSE, 1996). 
The production of hydrocarbons in the offshore process industry has the potential for 
events involving major fires and/or explosions (Krueger and Smith, 2003). This is 
reflected in examples of several offshore accidents, such as the 1988 Piper Alpha 
incident in the UK North Sea (Paté-Cornell, 1993), capsizing and sinking of the 
Petrobras P-36 in Roncador, Brazil (Atherton and Gil, 2010), explosion on the Cidade 
de São Mateus (PGJ, 2015), and fire on the Pemex Abkatun Alpha platform in the Gulf 
of the Mexico (Turner-Neal, 2015). According to Paté-Cornell (1993), the Piper Alpha 
tragedy caused 165 deaths due to an explosion after releasing of hydrocarbons. 
Atherton and Gil (2010) reported on series of explosion that had occurred in the 
Petrobras P-36 platform claiming 11 lives and a loss of up to $1 billion a year (Keep, 
2001). Recent explosion on Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) unit 
of Cidade de São Mateus caused 5 deaths and 4 missing crews. According to the Pemex 
press release, a fire outbreak in the Abkatun Alpha platform killed 4 people and injured 
as many as 16 others.  
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In process accidents, hydrocarbon leaks or release of materials may contribute more or 
less potential damage to accidents. For instance, on October 1944, a LNG tank in 
Cleveland, Ohio failed and released its entire contents, resulting in a vapor cloud 
explosion (VCE) from an unknown ignition source (Yang et al., 2011). In addition it 
caused the deaths of 130 people (Duerr, 2014). The flange leaked, and the presence of 
an ignition source caused multiple consequences including fireball and jet fire 
followed by VCE. Another LNG spill in 2004 in the Skikda LNG plant, Algeria 
triggered multiple explosions due to excessive pressure in an adjacent boiler and 
claimed 27 lives and injured 80 (Woodward and Pitblado, 2010). Due to a hydrocarbon 
release in the BP’s Texas City refinery in 2005, an explosion occurred which killed 15 
people and injured as many as 180 others (CSB, 2007). After the release, VCE 
occurred followed by pool fire (Kalantarnia et al., 2010; Khan and Amyotte, 2007). 
The leading cause stated is insufficient and improper knowledge to control the release 
and responses (Broadribb, 2006). Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), LNG and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) are identified as alternative fuels to liquid petroleum 
(Olanrewaju et al., 2013). As the demand for clean energy is uprising day by day, the 
shipping industry, especially flammable gas carriers (e.g., CNG, LNG, LPG and FLNG 
facility), is facing heavy pressure to avoid any disaster. In terms of design, 
construction, work force, operation and maintenance, natural gas carriers have proven 
their safety record. Due to a significant number of safety measures, accident 
frequencies are much lower for natural gas carriers when compared to other vessels 
(Håvold, 2010; Vanem et al., 2008; Yeo et al., 2016). Accident occurrences in LNG 
and LPG process facilities are well explained in literature (Atherton and Gil, 2010; 
CEC, 2015; Dadashzadeh et al., 2013a; HSE, 1996, 2005; Khan and Abbasi, 1999; 
Kletz, 1991). 
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In process industries, some accidents (e.g., leakage from a pipe, and crack from elbow) 
occur more frequently and can cause minor damage whilst other type of accidents (e.g., 
process tank failure, and overflow of a vessel) occur less frequently and can escalate 
into major accidents and cause potential losses. Incident, such as gas leakage is a 
common issue in offshore oil and gas process facilities and this event may 
subsequently lead to different credible accidents such as VCE, jet fire, pool fire, 
fireball and boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). In most cases, these 
types of events may have ended in catastrophic accidents. It has been reported that 
59% of these types of events have resulted in fire, 35% in explosions and 6% in gas 
clouds (Gómez-Mares et al., 2008). As stated by Bottelberghs (1995), marine accidents 
are comprised of scenarios including collision, fire and/or explosion, flooding and 
grounding. Focus on previous studies (fire and explosion) by Kim and Salvesen (2002), 
Koo et al. (2009) and Skarsbo (2011) were limited to individual fire and/or explosion 
modeling, ignoring evolving scenarios. Kim and Salvesen (2002) conducted a study 
on LNG vapor release which was addressed as a possible VCE. However, a potential 
pool fire scenario is completely ignored (Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b). Another study 
by Koo et al. (2009) on a LNG terminal focused on pool fire modeling. Hence, no 
consideration was given to VCE or other possible interactions such as jet fire 
(Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b). It is therefore essential to consider potential consequences 
as a leak or release event may lead to multiple consequences. A review of past 
accidents (CEC, 2015; Crowl, 2010; CSB, 2007, 2008; Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b; 
Håvold, 2010; Khan and Abbasi, 1999; Kletz, 1991; Kujala et al., 2009; NTSB, 1983; 
Paté-Cornell, 1993; PC, 2011; Rajendram et al., 2015) and models (Abbassi et al., 
2016; Ale et al., 2008; Ale et al., 2006; Ale et al., 2009; Antão et al., 2008; Antão and 
Soares, 2006; Antão and Soares, 2008; Baksh et al., 2015; Kim and Salvesen, 2002; 
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Koo et al., 2009; Røed et al., 2009; Skarsbo, 2011; Vanem et al., 2008; Wells, 1997; 
Yeo et al., 2016) demonstrates the need to evaluate the entire accident sequence to 
mitigate the impact, develop appropriate response methods, and prevent accidents by 
designing safety into the system.   
 
Based on accident scenario analysis of potential accidents, it is necessary to rank them 
according to their credibility, so the hazardous event can get most priority. Literature 
review on accident hazard index has shown that identification and ranking of process 
hazards mostly focused on Dow Index (Dow, 1967-87; Scheffler, 1994), Mond Index 
(GDG, 1970-85), Toxicity Index (Tyler et al., 1995) and accident hazard index 
mentioned as HIRA (Hazard Identification and Ranking) by Khan and Abbasi (1997). 
These hazard indices are limited to only industrial sites ignoring surrounding 
population, environment and assets; however, these indices have a strong influence on 
deciding adverse impact caused by a potential accident. Christen et al. (1994) took an 
initiative to rank the severity of past accidents on a scale of 0-1 without envisaging the 
damage potential from similar type of accidents in different premises. This ranking 
scale was considered as the most advanced approach by Khan and Abbasi (1997); 
however, site specific attributes were not considered during the operation of this scale. 
Keller et al. (1985) and Wyler and Bohnenblust (1991) also recommended a rank-
based system to rank past accidents yet forecasting of similar type of accident was 
overlooked. After reviewing above mentioned approaches, Khan and Abbasi (1997), 
proposed accident hazard index (AHI) that characterized accident consequences on a 
standard scale of 1-10. It overcame past limitations by incorporating different direct 
impact parameters such as surrounding population, asset, ecosystem and indirect 
impact of different environmental media such as soil, water and air to the model. 
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However, the AHI method is not able to model the evolving scenarios rather it 
considers individual consequences and rank them based on their credibility. After 
reviewing past accident investigation, the authors believe that there is a need for a new 
approach to envisage the most credible accident scenarios based on primary causes 
such as release event, release condition, type of discharge, type of dispersion, type of 
ignition and area of congestion at release site and to rank them accordingly. Therefore, 
in this study, a network based approach is undertaken to overcome common issues that 
exist in conventional methods. The proposed method is able to differentiate the 
consequence of specific events and predict probabilities for such events.  The updating 
process of consequence probabilities of fire and explosion scenarios are depending on 
new information of primary causes as they added to the system. Case studies from past 
accidents in chemical and offshore process industry are taken into consideration to 
demonstrate the application of the developed methodology. This method is meant to 
be useful for evolving scenarios, specifically for individual fire and/or explosion 
consequences on process facility that may occur due to deviation of any primary 
causes. The focus of the current study is on the integration of accident consequences 
and the potential outcome through accident case scenarios. 
 
This following section is organized as follows: section “Brief review of risk assessment 
methodologies” deliberates brief review of risk assessment methodologies in marine 
and offshore facilities; section “Quantitative risk analysis of offshore fire and 
explosion based on root causes” discusses about Quantitative risk analysis of offshore 
fire and explosion and the developed methodology for the selected scenario. In section 
“Application of the methodology: case studies” two case studies are provided to 
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demonstrate the application of the proposed methodology; section “Conclusion” gives 
the conclusions. 
2.2.   Brief review of risk assessment methodologies 
Risk assessment is often considered as an aid to the decision-making process (IMO, 
2002). In order to ensure safety, it is essential to reduce the risk and mitigate the 
occurrence of marine and offshore accidents to a level that is as low as reasonably 
practicable (ALARP). Due to high cost of offshore processing plant, severity of fire 
and/or explosion, and complexity of marine environment, it becomes an imperative 
necessity to determine fire and/or explosion risk analysis (HSE, 2005). As stated by 
Wang et al. (2015b), three kinds of researches are carried out worldwide on offshore 
fire and/or explosion risk analysis which comprises; (i) statistical methods, (ii) use of 
commercial software, and (iii) integration of new theory with traditional risk 
assessment methods. Among these  methods, statistical methods are used to predict 
fire and/or explosion risk based on historical data (Paik and Czujko, 2009). As 
mentioned by Vinnem (2007), the study of risk assessment is an important area of 
offshore processing facilities as it includes, (1) hazard identification, (2) cause and 
probability analysis, (3) accidental scenarios analysis, (4) consequence, damage and 
impairment analysis, (5) escape, evacuation and rescue analysis, (6) fatality risk 
assessment, and (7) analysis of risk reducing measures. Risk assessment process 
demonstrated in Figure 2–1 is adopted from Arendt (1990). 
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Figure 2–1: The risk assessment process.   
 
In the offshore oil and gas industry, quantitative risk analysis (QRA) has played an 
important role for decision-support in the planning phase for more than 20 years (Røed 
et al., 2009). It is often considered as an approach to access and manage safety of the 
process system. As referred by Pula et al. (2006), this technique includes four major 
steps: (1) hazard identification, (2) consequence analysis, (3) frequency assessment, 
and (4) risk quantification. Consequence analysis is considered as an integral part of 
risk assessment process. It is mentioned in the quantitative risk analysis guidelines that 
the complexity of a QRA builds on the events scenario based on available data and 
consequence information (CCPS, 2000). Depending on event scenarios, several 
mathematical models, viz. source models, fire and explosion models, and toxic gas 
models are applicable for consequence assessment (Khan and Abbasi, 1998b). 
 
A literature review is carried out to identify risk analysis methods of offshore fire 
and/or explosion. Khan (2001) proposed, maximum-credible accident scenarios 
(MCAS) method to shortlist the credible accident scenarios based on their 
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consequences and the likelihood of occurrence. The maximum credible accident 
represents maximum potential damage, viz. physical, financial and environmental 
caused by an accident. To account the MCAS method effectively, the most relevant 
case scenario from each unit requires to be shortlisted for the purpose of the study. 
There are four steps to follow in the MCAS method, i) develop all plausible accident 
scenarios, ii) calculate damage radii for each scenario, iii) estimate probability for each 
accident scenario, iv) classify and list the credible scenario. In second step, damage 
radii can be calculated using quantitative hazard indices. This approach helps to 
enhance the overall effort without compromising the accuracy of the study. Krueger 
and Smith (2003) demonstrated a scenario-based approach to calculate potential 
impacts of credible fire scenarios on the platform process equipment, structural 
members, and safety systems. Pula et al. (2005) proposed fire consequence model as a 
combination of submodels (e.g. individual fire models, and human impact model). 
Afterwards, Pula et al. (2006) demonstrated a revised version of the basic model. The 
performance result of the consequence model was compared with the output of 
computer software. Ale et al. (2006) developed a causal model for air transport safety 
to find causes of incidents and accidents. Ale et al. (2008) and Ale et al. (2009) 
demonstrated sequential logic and causal models followed by a safety barrier approach, 
which was translated into event tree, fault tree and Bayesian Belief Nets (BBN) to 
evaluate causal sequences and quantify risks. Vinnem (2013) proposed failure models 
for hydrocarbon leaks for offshore process plant based on 70 major hydrocarbon leaks. 
Ale et al. (2014) developed a dynamic risk management tool based on BBNs for the 
hydrocarbon industry to observe risk in real-time. Baksh et al. (2015) have shown non-
sequential network by implementing BN to calculate end events probabilities using 
case studies from offshore process facility. Recently, Yeo et al. (2016) have proposed 
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a dynamic risk assessment model using BN to investigate different risk factors 
associated with LNG offloading procedures that may result in collision and grounding. 
2.3.   Quantitative risk analysis of offshore fire and explosion based 
on root causes 
In the proposed scenario-based methodology, identification of evolving scenarios is 
the first step which includes shortlist of credible accident scenarios and identifying 
potential consequences including contributing factors. For instance, in a LNG process 
facility deviation from a normal operation can cause potential damages which consists 
of operating pressure in process facility, release rate of the liquid or gas, ignition source 
(e.g., engine room, and boiler room), temperature inside the facility, and wind speed 
outside of the process operation. After identification of evolving scenarios and 
potential consequences, the next step is to develop a consequence modelling 
framework. The aim of developing this framework is to identify the potential 
consequences for each specific scenario based on primary causes. The likelihood 
estimation of each specific accident is carried out in the following step by developing 
and implementing a BN for each scenario. For a given scenario, identification of 
significant losses such as fatalities, financial and environmental losses are also 
incorporated in subsequent steps using MCAS method (see details in Khan (2001)). 
These losses vary depending on a particular accident scenario. Therefore, consequence 
probabilities are estimated for each selected scenario. In the final step, the 
methodology ranks each specific scenario according to their priority based on potential 
damages, viz. fatalities, financial and environmental loss. The overall process of the 
developed methodology is illustrated in Figure 2–2. The main steps considered in the 
developed methodology are discussed in more details in the following sections. 
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Figure 2–2: The flowchart of scenario based ranking of the most credible scenarios.   
 
2.3.1.   Evolving scenario identification 
In the proposed methodology, potential fire/explosion consequences and evolving 
scenarios are identified through Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). Usually, 
scenarios are defined as the deviation of one or combination of different variables. 
After studying the potential accidents and scenarios that are developed due to 
deviations of relevant factors, significant consequences are identified using 
consequence modelling framework. Hence, all plausible accident scenarios are 
developed as a result of chemical, liquid or gas release. The aim is to identify and 
define the scenarios that may lead to fire and/or explosion. 
2.3.2.   Analysis of the accident 
Release of hazardous material is continually initiated by a loss of containment. This 
may occur due to a failure of equipment (e.g., pipe leak, valve failure, and pipeline 
rupture). There are innumerable situations where gases, liquids, and hazardous 
chemicals are produced, stored, or used in a process that if released, could potentially 
result in a hazardous event. Hence, process accidents can be classified into three 
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categories, viz. fire, explosion and toxic release which further can be classified into 
sub-categories such as fireball, flash fire, jet fire, pool fire, VCE and BLEVE. Fire can 
only occur when it results from the mixing of flammable gases with air or other 
oxidative means (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010). Release mechanism of heavy gas and 
dispersion from a pressurised liquefied storage is shown in Figure 2–3 which is 
adopted from MINERVA (2015). Type of release can be categorised into sub-
categories, (1) discrete, and (2) continuous, as presented in Figure 2–4 (O&G, 2015). 
During process leak/release, several factors play a major role to initiate the event and 
assist the progression of fire and explosion consequences. After the initial release, the 
consequence can be different depending on released substances (e.g., liquid, gas, liquid 
gas and vapour) and environments such as high pressure, wind and temperature. For 
instance, release of a hydrocarbon may form liquid pool which is then ignited if the 
released material is flammable and ignition sources are available. However, presence 
of immediate ignition may lead to pool fire. This liquid can be evaporated and form 
flammable cloud, which may lead to flash fire if delayed ignition occurs. The 
flammable cloud can disperse depending on meteorological conditions (e.g., the wind 
speed) and delayed ignition possibly leads to VCE (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010; 
Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b; Mannan, 2012; Vinnem, 2007), which is also termed as 
unconfined, partly confined or confined explosion. If the released material is a mixture 
of two phases, gas cloud can form and continuous release with sonic speed can disperse 
quickly which, if ignited, may lead to jet fire (Planas and Casal, 2009). Fireball can 
occur due to a sudden leak and ignition of pressurised flammable gases. In any case, 
the final accident scenario may lead to fire, explosion, toxic release or quickly disperse 
into the atmosphere. Explosion can be defined as an occurrence of blast wave due to 
rapid release of energy (CCPS, 2010). This release of pressure can be caused by: 
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nuclear reactions, loss of containment in high-pressure vessels, high explosives, 
vapour explosions, runaway reactions, combustion of dust, mist or gas (including 
vapours) in air or in other oxidizers (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010). BLEVE is also 
another type of explosion, which occurs due to flashing of liquids when a vessel with 
high vapour pressure substance fails (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010; Dadashzadeh et 
al., 2013b).  
Liquid
Vapour
Wind
Large liquid droplets
Rapid flash-off and cooling, flash atomization
Evaporating liquid pool
Two-phase dense gas plume
 
Figure 2–3: Heavy gas dispersion released from pressurized liquefied storage. 
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Figure 2–4: (a) Continuous release of hydrocarbon in normal operating conditions, (b) 
Continuous release of hydrocarbon in isolated state (fixed mass), (c) Discrete release of 
hydrocarbon in rapid short duration (fixed mass). 
2.3.3.   Accidence consequence framework development 
Major process and offshore accidents can lead to evolving scenarios due to interactions 
among different events; for instance, fire followed by an explosion (Dadashzadeh et 
al., 2013b). The degree of consequences due to the accident event largely depends on 
type of flammable materials released, release condition, type of discharge, dispersion, 
ignition, area of congestion, amount of release and surrounding environment. Due to 
evolving characteristics of a consequence, several impact factors are studied and taken 
into consideration during the modelling. After reviewing and analysing historical 
documents (CSB, 2007; Gómez-Mares et al., 2008; Håvold, 2010; Khan et al., 2002; 
Kujala et al., 2009; Ventikos, 2002; Ventikos and Psaraftis, 2004; Wang et al., 2005) 
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on fire and/or explosion consequence analysis, the author is trying to incorporate 
potential factors interacting in numerous consequences. The resulted framework is 
demonstrated in Figure 2–5.  
Release event
Unpressurised Pressurised
Liquid Pool/
Vapor
2-Phase Gas
Flash & rainoutEvaporation
Dispersion
Jet Dense Neutral Immediate Delayed
Ignition
Pool fire
Flash 
fire
VCE Fireball Jet Fire BLEVE
External fire
Liquid
Other event
Explosion
Sudden 
Expansion
Runaway 
Reaction
 
Figure 2–5: Fire and explosion consequence phenomena and their interrelationship. 
 
2.4.   Accident scenario likelihood estimation 
2.4.1.   Bayesian network (BN) 
The BN incorporates two parts, viz. the qualitative representation that includes a 
graphical structure and the quantitative representation that includes the conditional 
probabilities (Christen et al., 1994; Korb and Nicholson, 2010; Pearl, 1988). Accidents 
in large-scale and complex process facilities can be modelled using BN. The BN is a 
widely used probabilistic graphical approach to represent accident scenario (Khakzad 
et al., 2011, 2013a) in marine and offshore system. The representation of the BN 
structure is through directed acyclic graphs (DAG) G = (V, E), where V denotes the 
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set of nodes and E denotes the set of edges of the graph structure. Each edge is a 
directed link between two nodes, which represents the causal probabilistic dependence 
between the linked nodes. In addition, A conditional probability table (CPT) is 
assigned to determine the conditional dependency between the linked nodes (Jensen 
and Nielsen, 2007). The joint probability distribution of a set of random variables 
 1 ,..., nU A A based on the conditional independence and the chain rule (Pearl, 
1988), included in the network as: 
1
( ) ( | ( ))
n
i i
i
P U P A Pa A

                  (2-1) 
where P(U) denotes the joint probability distribution of variables and Pa (Ai) as the 
parent set of variable Ai.  
 
Bayes theorem is used in the BN to update the occurrence probability (prior) of events 
given new observations, called evidence E, to yield the consequence probability 
(posterior) using following equation:  
( , ) ( , )
( | )
( ) ( , )
U
P U E P U E
P U E
P E P U E
 

                                                                      (2-2) 
In Bayes’ Theorem, the knowledge of the thing before the test is called the “Prior 
Probability”, the accuracy of the test is called the “Conditional Probability”, and the 
final result after the test is called the “Posterior Probability”. A simple BN example 
containing six nodes and seven arcs is presented in Figure 2–6. In this small network, 
the node consequence has two states, viz. S1 and S2 which are influenced by type of 
ignition, node C (e.g., quick ignition and delayed ignition), meanwhile S1 requires a 
delayed ignition and S2 requires a quick ignition (Table 2-1). 
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S1 S2
 
Figure 2–6: A typical BN for liquid propane release and potential consequences. 
 
Table 2-1: Possible consequences based on primary causes in a liquid propane release. 
Discharge 
type (A) 
Discharge 
condition (B) 
Ignition 
type (C) 
Pool formation 
(D) 
Consequence 
Liquid Continuous Quick Yes S2 
Liquid Continuous Delayed No S1 
 
BNs are favoured over conventional probabilistic techniques as they offer advantages 
such as (1) BN can be used to model accident scenarios and determine the probabilities 
of different scenarios using accident prior information, (2) the dependency and 
conditionality of the primary causes and consequences (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007), (3) 
the accident information can be updated at any time using the real system data, and (4) 
adding a new piece of information in BN requires only a small number of directed 
edges in addition to small number of probabilities (Pearl, 1988). 
2.4.2.   Development of the BN model 
In the proposed method, a method of applying BN in the consequence assessment has 
been suggested. The model is developed based on fire and explosion consequence 
framework mentioned in Figure 2-5. This figure is being translated into a BN model. 
After identifying all plausible hazards, the BN model is constructed to formulate 
possible contributing factors (e.g., release condition, type of discharge, dispersion, 
type of ignition and area of congestion) and accident consequences based on previous 
studies and expert judgement. The proposed scenario based BN model includes the 
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following main steps; (1) Design of the consequence modelling framework, and the 
BN, (2) Calculation and analyses of the likelihood results using probabilistic approach 
(e.g., forward analysis in BN). The BN is constructed for each individual consequence 
(e.g., pool fire, jet fire, fireball, BLEVE, VCE and toxic release) to identify and analyse 
the causal factors that lead to the final events.  
2.4.3.   BN construction for consequences and ranking of the scenario 
The BN construction begins by considering release of material or process leak 
including impact factors such as release condition, type of discharge, type of 
dispersion, type of ignition and area of congestion. Considering previous studies, 
ignition probability and occurrence probability of release event have taken into 
consideration. However, occurrence probability for other contributing factors (e.g., 
release condition, type of discharge, and type of dispersion) are not available and these 
probabilities are assigned based on expert judgement. The five experts, who have more 
than ten years of research and industry experience in the processing industry and are 
familiar with the risk and reliability, have been selected to assign the probabilities of 
the root causes. Release conditions refer to type of release based on accident scenarios. 
It consists of four states viz. (i) pressurised, (ii) unpressurised, (iii) others, and (iv) no 
release. Release state “others” has been kept as demonstrating sudden expansion and 
runaway reaction of liquid and gas. However, “no release” has been kept supporting 
no release option for the BN nodes viz. release conditions, discharge type, liquid pool, 
flash and rainout, evaporation, and dispersion. Also, “no effect” is considered in 
“consequences” and “credibility ranking” node. Here, “no effect” state depends on “no 
release”. Simply, if there is no release there will be no consequences/no effect. Four 
types of discharge have been considered being, (i) gas, (ii) two-phase, (iii) liquid, and 
(iv) vapour. Two nodes viz. “Pressure build up” and “Runaway reaction” show 
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Boolean values “Yes” and “No” as the outcome. The nodes “Pressure build up”, 
“Discharge type” and “Runaway reaction” are dependent on “Release conditions”. 
Similarly, “Flash and rainout”, “Dispersion”, “Consequences”, and “Liquid pool” are 
dependent on “Discharge type”. Three types of dispersion are included in “Dispersion” 
node viz. jet, dense cloud and neutral. “Area of congestion” has two states being 
“unconfined” and “confined” area. Similarly, “Ignition” node has three different states 
being “Early ignition”, “Delay ignition” and “No ignition”. The “Consequences” and 
“Credibility ranking” node consist of nine different states viz. BLEVE, fireball, pool 
fire, flash fire, toxic effect, VCE, jet fire, explosion and no effect.     
 
In the present study, a probabilistic approach (BN) is followed by a mathematical 
model that is integrated with accident causation factors. The evolving scenarios from 
release events to credibility ranking for a general release event are presented in Figure 
2–7. The illustrated figure is a simplification of the conversion of fire and explosion 
consequence framework to BNs. A typical conditional probability table (CPT) for 
consequences of the proposed BN model is also presented in Table 2-2. 
Release 
Events
Release 
Condition
Discharge 
Type
Flash & 
Rainout
Pressure Build 
Up
Liquid Pool
Runaway 
Reaction
Dispersion
Evaporation
Area of 
Congestion
Consequences
Type of Ignition
Credibility 
Ranking
 
Figure 2–7: A generic BN of liquid/gas release event. 
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Table 2-2: A typical CPT for fire and/or explosion consequences. 
Causes Consequences 
Discharge Dispersion Ignition Jet Fire CVCE Flash Fire Fireball 
Gas Jet Delay - - 1 - 
Two phase Jet Delay - - 1 - 
Liquid Jet Delay - - 1 - 
Gas Dense Cloud Delay - 1 - - 
Two phase Dense Cloud Delay - 1 - - 
Liquid Dense Cloud Delay - 1 - - 
Gas - Early 1 - - - 
Two phase - Early 1 - - - 
Liquid - Early 1 - - - 
Gas - Early - - - 1 
 
2.4.4.   Ranking of the accident scenario and probability estimation 
The credibility ranking in this study is adopted from Khan (2001), measured on a scale 
of 0 to 1, and is demonstrated in Figure 2–8. The classification of credibility is 
distributed in three zones, viz. uncertainty, credibility and maximum credibility as 
explained in MCAS method. These credibility factors are demonstrated on a credibility 
scale where uncertainty (0-0.2) postures lowest risk, credibility (0.2-0.5) postures 
enough damage and maximum credibility (≥0.5) postures catastrophes. Based on 
primary causes and specific condition for a scenario, fire and/or explosion 
consequences (e.g., BLEVE, explosion, fireball, flash fire, jet fire, pool fire, and VCE) 
are identified. Afterwards, potential damages (e.g., fatalities, financial, and 
environmental loss) are estimated using MCAS method. Based on these three 
parameters, each specific scenario is ranked according to their priority; compared with 
other scenarios and further analysed to choose the most credible ones.  
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Figure 2–8: Classification of credibility in MCAS method. 
 
2.5.   Application of the methodology: case studies 
In this section, the proposed model in Section 2.4.2 is demonstrated on two case studies 
of ammonia and LNG release in chemical and offshore process facilities. The detailed 
scenarios are analysed using BN as shown in Figure 2–7. The probabilities of basic 
events are assigned based on literature review and expert judgement.  
 
Ammonia is a colourless gas and lighter than air. It is highly soluble in water and can 
be liquefied at room temperature by applying 8-10 atm pressure. Liquid ammonia can 
be boiled at -33.5°C under 1 atm pressure. It also freezes at a temperature of -77.8°C. 
Likewise, LNG is a condensed natural gas as its boiling temperature ranges from -
166oC to -157oC at atmospheric pressure. It includes component mixture of methane, 
ethane, propane, nitrogen and other particles; however, these particles are combustible 
with a lower flammable limit (LFL) of 4-5% by volume in air and an upper flammable 
limit (UFL) of 15%, depending on temperature (Bernatik et al., 2011).  Ammonia gas 
is flammable in air in the range of 16-25% by volume and can explode if released in 
an enclosed space with the presence of an ignition source. It is considered a high health 
hazard as ammonia gas can cause lung injury and the liquefied ammonia gas can cause 
36 
 
frostbite and corrosive injury to skin and eyes (HHS, 2000). LNG in liquid form itself 
will not explode within storage tanks, since it is stored at approximately -256°F (-
160°C) and at atmospheric pressure. If LNG is spilled on water or land, it will not mix 
with the water or soil, but evaporates and dissipates into the air leaving no residue. The 
resulting LNG vapours (methane) can be ignited with the presence of an ignition 
source where the concentration is above the LFL and below UFL. However, LNG 
release due to leakage or rupture in piping under pressurised condition can cause flash 
fire, pool fire, jet fire, BLEVE, fireball, explosion, asphyxiation, cryogenic burns and 
Rapid Phase Transformation (RPT) as mentioned by Woodward and Pitblado (2010). 
2.5.1.   Case study 1: Ammonia release in chemical process facility 
Implementation of the developed methodology is explained using a liquefied ammonia 
release study to envisage the most credible accident scenarios based on primary 
influence factors. If liquefied ammonia is released to the atmosphere in pressurised 
condition, it can give rise to a two-phase discharge and the physical phenomena can 
be changed to liquid atomization (break-up), rainout and expansion to ambient pressure 
(Busini et al., 2011). It should be noted that this is a hypothetical case study to simply 
explain the application of the proposed methodology which is equally applicable to 
complex offshore processing facilities as well. 
 
A vessel, containing 500 metric tons of liquefied ammonia at 15°C and 6.5 atm, is 
located in one corner of a fertilizer plant. The vessel is connected with one input line, 
one outflow line, a pressure-relief valve and other conventional safety devices. The 
population density near the plant is about 250 persons/km2, and asset density is around 
$300/m2 near the vessel. A bird sanctuary is observed about 1,000 m away from the 
site. A small truck is parked about 200 m away with engine turned on. Relevant 
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parameters considered for this study are presented in Table 2-3. The value of these 
parameter has been adopted from previous research (Khan and Abbasi, 1997; Khan 
and Abbasi, 1998a).  
Table 2-3: Important parameters for the ammonia release study. 
Parameters Value 
Chemical involved Ammonia 
Quantity of the chemical involved 5,00,000 kg 
Phase of the chemical Liquefied 
Unit operation Storage 
Operating temperature, T 15°C 
Operating pressure 6.5 atm 
Degree of conjunction at the site 0.40 
Site population density, PD (within region of 2000m radius) 250 persons/km2 
Asset density, AD (within region of 500m radius) 300 ($/m2) 
Unacceptable financial loss, UFL 10000 ($/yr) 
Population distribution factor (PDF) 0.3 (dimensionless) 
Weather probability factor, WPF 0.3 (dimensionless) 
Importance factor, IM 1.0 (dimensionless) 
 
Based on the information provided in the selected case study, five different accident 
scenarios are considered, as follows: 
 
Scenario 1: High pressure in the vessel causes the pressure-relief valve (at the top of 
the vessel) to open, which leads to a continuous release of ammonia to the atmosphere 
until 80% of the chemical is released. 
 
Scenario 2: Due to improper maintenance or other problems, a leak develops in the 
vessel’s input or output pipeline. The leaking area is believed to be 40% of the 
pipeline’s cross-sectional area. This scenario is modelled as continuous release of 
liquid ammonia near ground level causing subsequent evaporation and dispersion. 
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Scenario 3: High pressure develops in the vessel either due to overfilling or to a 
runaway reaction. The instantaneous release of high pressure causes the vessel to fail 
as a boiling-liquid, expanding-vapour explosion (BLEVE), and the released chemical 
disperses into the atmosphere. 
 
Scenario 4: Excessively high pressure develops in the vessel beyond the design 
capacity of the pressure relief valve and fails instantly causing release of a large 
amount of dense gas. The instantaneously released chemical disperses into the 
atmosphere and ignition source causes VCE. 
 
Scenario 5: Ammonia is released from the joints, causing a pool of liquid to form. The 
released chemical subsequently evaporates into the atmosphere and disperses. 
 
The summary of the case study result is presented in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-4: Credibility factors for the scenarios in the ammonia release. 
Scenario Damage 
Radius,  
m 
Frequency  
of Occurrence 
/per year 
Outcome Fire and Explosion Toxic Release 
    Financial 
loss 
Fatalities Environmental 
loss 
L1 Fatalities Environmental 
loss 
L2 
1 2500 5.0E-05 Toxic event - - - - 1.00 0.98 1.00 
2 1100 4.0E-04 Toxic event - - - - 1.00 1.0 1.00 
3 250* 
1270 
7.0E-05 BLEVE 0.41 0.10 0.01 0.47  
0.79 
 
0.35 
 
0.86 
4 350† 
1200 
1.0E-06 VCE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
5 950 8.0E-05 Toxic event - - - - 0.51 0.22 0.61 
*Damage radius for BLEVE 
†Damage radius for VCE 
 
The credible values presented in Table 2-4 are calculated following MCAS method 
where L1 stands for credibility of fire and explosion and L2 stands for credibility of 
toxic release. 
1 [1 (1 Financial loss)(1 Fatalities)(1 Environmental loss)]L                                    (2-3) 
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2 [1 (1 Fatalities)(1 Environmental loss)]L                                                                       (2-4) 
 
After analysing the selected accident scenarios from above release, potential 
consequences such as BLEVE, VCE and toxic release are identified. All relevant data 
are extracted from the selected accident scenario based on scenario assessment. The 
simulation result of Figure 2–7 is shown in Figure 2–9. In the BN, primary causes and 
consequences due to ammonia release are drawn through causal arcs. The BNs in this 
study are assessed using the software GeNIe 2.1 (BayesFusion, 2017). In scenario 1, it 
is clear that pressurised liquefied ammonia release has occurred. Due to a pressurised 
release, leaking ammonia gives rise to a two-phase discharge. After the two-phase 
release, flash and rainout, liquid pool and evaporation may occur due to ambient 
conditions. As a result, jet, dense cloud or no dispersion may occur in the release 
scenario. Since the release area is unconfined and no ignition source is present, there 
is a chance of toxic effect in the accident scenario. In case of scenario 2 and 5, almost 
same phenomena have occurred as scenario 1. In scenario 3, a BLEVE has occurred 
due to increasing pressure inside the vessel. The likelihood of a BLEVE, P 
(Consequence = BLEVE) is calculated based on available condition (i.e. Release event 
= yes, Release conditions = Others, Pressure build up = yes, Runaway reaction = no, 
Area of congestion = unconfined and Type of ignition = early). On the contrary, 
backward or diagnosis analysis can find the most probable causes for the occurrence 
of BLEVE. For example, with all probabilities remaining the same for the BN, the 
consequence of a BLEVE can be selected as 100% which in turn shows the 
contribution of all precursor values in the network. It is evident from the network that 
despite any evidence on type of congestion and type of ignition, there is 48% chance 
of a BLEVE and almost 2% chance of an explosion (not shown in the figures). If only 
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pressure builds-up inside the vessel and no runaway reaction occurs, the chance of a 
BLEVE is still 48%. However, if early ignition is selected as evidence despite type of 
congestion, the chance of a BLEVE is increased to 50% (not shown in the figures). If 
it is unconfined area and early ignition is selected as evidence, then the chance of a 
BLEVE is about 100% (Figure 2–9). In scenario 4, VCE has occurred due to high 
pressure and delayed ignition. Due to a pressurised release, flash and rainout or liquid 
pool may occur. A dense cloud of released gas is dispersed to a nearby ignition source 
and causes VCE. For above cases, fatalities, financial, and the environmental loss are 
estimated using MCAS method. Due to a BLEVE, financial loss has been observed to 
0.41, fatalities to 0.1 and environmental loss to 0.01 ( 
Table 2-4). Using these values in Eqs. (2-3) and (2-4), final credible value for a BLEVE 
has been estimated to 0.47 which is in credible region. A higher fatalities and 
environmental loss are observed due to a toxic release in scenario 1 and 2. However, a 
higher degree of financial loss is also observed in scenario 3 due to a BLEVE. In terms 
of fire and explosion, scenario 3 is the most credible. In terms of toxic release, scenario 
1, 2 and 3 are the most credible. Overall, scenario 3 is the most credible in terms of 
combined effect of fire and explosion and toxic release. 
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Figure 2–9: BN simulation result for ammonia release study of scenario 3 (BLEVE). 
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2.5.2.   Case study 2: LNG release in FLNG facility 
In this case study, four different accident scenarios that are likely to occur during the 
FLNG offloading mechanism are considered. LNG vapours are non-toxic; however, 
accidental release of LNG can be deviated to evolving scenarios ranging from a 
destructive VCE to pool fire with successive explosion of its contents. The FLNG 
facility may pose mostly fire and explosion hazards.  
 
On a bright sunny day, 20,000 kg of LNG is stored at an extremely cold temperature 
(-162º C) in a double-walled tank at 25 kPa (3.6 psi) on Prelude FLNG. The floating 
platform is about 488 m long and 74 m wide. The wind speed is 3 m/s with an ambient 
temperature of 25°C. The tank is connected by a pipe (10-inch diameter, control valve 
and other conventional safety devices) to offloading system. The facility is near an 
offloading vessel surrounded by water. There are about 230 people working in both 
FLNG facility and offloading vessel. Asset density around the floating unit is 276916 
($/m2). There is a marine ecosystem surrounded by water. Relevant parameters 
considered for this study are presented in Table 2-5.  
Table 2-5: Important parameters for the LNG release study. 
Parameters Value 
Hydrocarbon LNG 
Quantity of the released hydrocarbon 20000 kg 
Phase of the hydrocarbon Liquefied 
Unit operation Processing facility 
Operating temperature, T -162°C 
Operating pressure 25 kPa 
Degree of conjunction at the site 0.40 
Site population density, PD (within region of 500m radius) 6.40E-03 persons/m2 
Asset density, AD (within region of 500m radius) 276916 ($/m2) 
Unacceptable financial loss, UFL 1.00E06 ($/yr) 
Unacceptable damage area, UDA 1000 (m2/yr) 
Population distribution factor (PDF) 0.3 (dimensionless) 
Weather probability factor, WPF 0.3 (dimensionless) 
Importance factor, IM  1.0 (dimensionless) 
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Based on the information provided in the selected case study, four different accident 
scenarios are considered, as follows:  
 
Scenario 1: LNG is released from the connected pipe, causing a pool of liquid to form. 
The released hydrocarbon subsequently evaporates into the atmosphere and disperses. 
 
Scenario 2: An instantaneous release of LNG leads to liquid pools evaporating to form 
a flammable vapour plume. After a quick dispersion, at 60s, delayed ignition occurs in 
the area, which leads to a destructive VCE in the process. 
 
Scenario 3: LNG liquid escapes from the double walled tank due to a crack in supply 
line, forming vapour cloud, which is then pushed, downwind toward the engine room, 
where it likely ignites, and jet fire is formed. 
 
Scenario 4: Pipelines disconnected from offloading vessels and fall into water causing 
a continuous release of LNG on surface water initiating subsequent wave and RPT. 
 
The summary of the above case study result is presented in Table 2-6.  
Table 2-6: Credibility factors for the scenarios in the LNG release. 
Scenario Damage 
Radius, m 
Frequency of 
Occurrence 
/per year 
Outcome Fire and Explosion Credibility 
    Financial 
loss 
Fatalities Environmental 
loss 
L1 
1 450 2.80E-05 Vapour  - - - - 
2 300* 
450† 
2.60E-06 
Pool fire  
VCE 
0.20 
0.46 
0.14 
0.31 
7.35E-04 
1.65E-03 
0.31 
0.63 
3 400‡ 6.50E-07 Jet fire 0.09 0.06 3.26E-04 0.14 
4 200 2.90E-10 RPT - - - - 
*Damage radius for Pool fire 
†Damage radius for VCE  
‡Damage radius for Jet fire 
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The credible values presented in Table 2-6 are calculated following Eq. (2-3) stated in 
the MCAS method. After studying the selected accident scenario, fire and explosion 
consequences such as pool fire, jet fire, and VCE are identified. Following the 
shortlisted accident scenarios, hypothetical values are assigned as the prior 
probabilities of primary causes in the BN. The BNs in this study are also assessed using 
the software GeNIe and the output for scenario 2 of the developed BN is presented in 
Figure 2–10. In scenario 1 of the case study, unpressurised release of LNG occurs. The 
released vapour forms a liquid pool and disperses into the atmosphere as soon as it 
evaporates. In above scenario, fire and explosion events have not occurred due to 
absence of ignition. In case of scenario 2, unpressurised release of LNG forms a liquid 
pool and ignites in presence of early ignition. The resulting vapour disperses, and 
delayed ignition contributes in destructive VCE. The likelihood of pool fire with 
observed data, P (Consequence = Pool Fire) is calculated based on available condition 
(i.e., Release event = yes, Release conditions = unpressurised, Discharge type = 
Vapour, Liquid pool = yes, Area of congestion = unconfined and Type of ignition = 
early). It is evident from the network that due to quick ignition the chance of pool fire 
is about 100% according to the calculation results of the BN. In the proposed BN, 
backward analysis presents the most probable causes for the occurrence of pool fire. 
Despite any evidence on type of congestion and type of ignition, there is 3% chance of 
pool fire (not shown in figures). However, if early ignition is selected as evidence 
despite type of congestion, the chance of pool fire is increased to 50%. Due to an early 
ignition and unconfined released area, the chance of pool fire is about 100%. The 
resulting liquid pool may evaporate and disperse as dense cloud of vapour which 
ignites if delayed ignition occurs. The chance of VCE is about 33% due to contribution 
of dense cloud, confined space and delayed ignition. From the calculation for 
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importance degree of probability, it can be observed that the effects of some specific 
primary causes (e.g., release condition, discharge, liquid pool, dispersion, area of 
congestion and type of ignition) on the probability of pool fire are higher compare to 
other primary causes. In scenario 3, a pressurised release of LNG has occurred. The 
resulting gas cloud is ignited in engine room through an ignition source and jet fire has 
occurred. In case of scenario 4, continuous release of LNG into surface water causes 
rapid phase transformation (RPT) which may result in minor explosion. Using the 
MCAS method, fatalities, financial, and the environmental loss are estimated for above 
scenarios. Due to pool fire, financial loss has been observed to 0.20, fatalities to 0.14 
and environmental loss to 7.35E-04. These values are used in Eqs. (2-3) to calculate 
final credible value of pool fire. The final credible value of pool fire is estimated to 
0.31 which is in the credible region. In case of VCE, financial loss has been observed 
to 0.46, fatalities to 0.31 and environmental loss to 1.65E-03. Final credible value due 
to VCE has been estimated to 0.63 which is in the maximum credible region. In case 
of jet fire, final credible has been estimated to 0.14 which is in uncertain region. In 
above cases, a higher degree of financial loss and fatalities are observed in scenario 2 
although minor environmental losses are observed in scenarios 2 and 3. Overall, 
scenario 2 is the most credible in terms of fire and explosion. 
 
Figure 2-11 demonstrates the effects of primary causes on fire and/or explosion 
consequences (case study 2). Figure 2-11 (a-c) clearly shows the effects of release 
condition, type of discharge and type of dispersion on individual fire/explosion 
consequences. From the figure, it is clear that unpressurised condition has more effect 
on pool fire compare to VCE and jet fire. In terms of discharged material, liquid has 
similar effect on both VCE and jet fire. However, pool fire is highly influenced by 
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vapour. Effect of dispersion on pool fire, VCE and jet fire is demonstrated in Figure-
2-11 (c). From the figure, it is clear that dense cloud has more effect on VCE. 
Credibility of pool fire, VCE and jet fire is presented in Figure 2-11 (d) where VCE 
ranks the top in terms of damages. 
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Figure 2–10: BN simulation result for LNG release study of scenario 2 (pool fire). 
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(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 2–11: Probability of primary causes (a) release conditions, (b) type of discharge, and (c) 
dispersion for different consequences of pool fire, VCE and jet fire, and (d) credibility of pool 
fire, VCE and jet fire. 
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2.6.   Conclusion  
In this article, a network-based approach is proposed to envisage the most probable 
accident scenarios in complex offshore process facilities. A review of existing 
scenario-based modelling approaches reveals few limitations in modelling of accident 
scenarios such as consequence analysis of individual fire and explosion ignoring the 
complex scenarios. It is evident that the majority of existing models focus on individual 
accident modelling approach. However, in real life, accident events can evolve through 
various consequences. In a process accident, more or less potential damages can cause 
fatalities, financial loss as well as environmental damages. Besides damages, it is 
necessary to identify a probable accident event, magnitude of damages and its impact on 
the environment to estimate and envisage prospective loss. Hence, identification and 
ranking of potential damages are needed to ensure maximum safety. To identify potential 
causes and consequences in a process accident scenario, a consequence modelling 
framework is developed based on previous literature review. A BN is developed to model 
evolving scenarios and credibility. The proposed methodology is applicable for modelling 
probable evolving scenarios, evaluating their occurrences and ranking most probable 
scenarios by applying case specific data. The application of the proposed model has been 
demonstrated on two specific case studies, viz. ammonia and LNG release on process 
facility. The causes and consequences of ammonia and LNG release event are 
investigated through BN method and further assessed though MCAS method to 
validate the model. The methodology developed in this study using BN is effective in 
determining the most credible accident scenario in offshore process industries due to 
evolving scenarios generated from fire, explosion and toxic release. Using MCAS 
method, fatalities, financial and environmental losses are estimated for each scenario. 
Further, these values are used to calculate final credible values for each scenario which 
is incorporated in the network. In the present study, the proposed model is combining 
51 
 
potential consequences in a unique specific model. By taking advantage of BN, 
conditional dependency has been illustrated between the primary causation factors and 
the consequences through direct causal arcs. The posterior likelihood of accident 
consequences has been estimated using prior data. In addition, the prior probability has 
been updated considering the evidence of specific consequences. The proposed 
concept model is applicable to the marine and offshore process facility; however, with 
further modification it can be applied to other process facilities including aviation and 
traffic accident for analysing possible consequences. 
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Chapter 3:   Marine transportation risk 
assessment using Bayesian network: 
application to Arctic waters  
 
The work presented in this chapter has been submitted for review in Ocean 
Engineering. The paper has been edited for inclusion into this thesis to improve 
readability. The citation for this research article is: 
Baksh, A.-A, Abbassi, R., Garaniya, V. and Khan, F. (2017). Marine Transportation 
Risk Assessment Using Bayesian Network: Application to Arctic Waters. Ocean 
Engineering. 159: 422-436. DOI:10.1016/j.oceaneng.2018.04.024. 
Abstract 
Maritime transportation poses risks regarding possible accidents resulting in damage 
to vessels, crew members and to the ecosystem. The safe navigation of ships, especially 
in the Arctic waters, is a growing concern to maritime authorities. This study proposes 
a new risk model applicable to the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to investigate the 
possibility of marine accidents such as collision, foundering and grounding. The model 
is developed using Bayesian Network (BN). The proposed risk model has considered 
different operational and environmental factors that affect shipping operations. 
Historical data and expert judgments are used to estimate the base value (prior values) 
of various operational and environmental factors. The application of the model is 
demonstrated through a case study of an oil-tanker navigating the NSR. The case study 
confirms the highest collision, foundering and grounding probabilities in the East 
Siberian Sea. However, foundering probabilities are very low in all five regions. By 
running uncertainty and sensitivity analyses of the model, a significant change in the 
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likelihood of the occurrence of accidental events is identified. The model suggests ice 
effect as a dominant factor in accident causation. The case study illustrates the priority 
of the model in investigating the operational risk of accidents. The estimated risk 
provides early warning to take appropriate preventive and mitigative measures to 
enhance the overall safety of shipping operations. 
3.1.   Introduction 
The vast seaborne trade has permitted an enormous variety of resources to be widely 
accessible around the world and has thus helped accelerate the world economy. More 
than 90% of global trade is carried out via sea routes (IMO, 2012) as it is cost-effective. 
The Northern transport corridor, known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic 
region, is one of the potential trade routes connecting major Asian and European ports. 
The opening of the NSR has reduced shipping distances and fuel consumption as well 
as emissions (Kitagawa, 2008). According to Schøyen and Bråthen (2011), the distance 
between a Northwest-European port and the Far East is reduced approximately 40% 
by using the NSR as an alternative route compared to the traditional route through the 
Suez Canal.  
 
The presence of sea ice, extremely low temperatures and drifting icebergs has made 
this region mostly inaccessible for marine transportation and poses threats to mariners 
and the current ship technologies (Ellis and Brigham, 2009). As the size and number 
of ships have increased significantly over time (Toffoli et al., 2005), the possibility of 
shipping accidents in this region is expected to grow (Balto, 2014; Borgerson, 2008). 
Previous studies confirm that increasing traffic of oil tankers in the Barents Sea will 
result in a significant number of accidents if further maritime safety measures are not 
attained (NME, 2011).  
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A combination of accidental events and processes are recognised as the leading 
contributors to ship accidents (Yang et al., 2013). Human error and visibility issues are 
identified as significant contributors to vessel collisions (Fowler and Sørgård, 2000; 
Khan et al., 2017; Macrae, 2009; Merrick et al., 2000; Van Dorp et al., 2001; Zhang 
and Thai, 2016). Additionally, human fatigue, lack of technical knowledge of ship 
systems, poor communication, faulty policies, practices and standards, are significant 
human and organisational related issues facing the maritime industry (Dhillon, 2007; 
Talley, 2002). 
 
The safe navigation of ships, especially in the Arctic waters, is of ultimate concern for 
researchers as well as maritime authorities. Risk assessment on maritime transportation 
and risk reduction measures are a part of ongoing studies. However, limited research 
has been conducted on the effect of both cold and harsh environmental conditions on 
shipping accidents in this region. This paper proposes a new risk model applicable to 
the NSR considering the particular environmental and operational conditions to 
quantify the risk of transit on Arctic routes. 
3.1.1.   Literature review regarding existing accident models 
In maritime risk and consequence assessment, several methods have been applied to 
estimate the causation probability. Among the ship accidents, collision has been the 
focus of many related studies in recent years. Fujii and Shiobara (1971) introduced one 
of the most common approaches to estimate the number of ship collisions, where the 
number of collisions is calculated as a product of the number of geometrical collision 
candidates and a causation probability. Macduff (1974) initially proposed a ship 
collision and grounding modelling based on available historical accident records. 
However, it lacked a clear understanding of accident causes. Risk analysis tools such 
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as fault trees are developed to estimate the causation probability of collision event 
(Pedersen, 1995; Rosqvist et al., 2002). Marine Accident Risk Calculation System 
(MARCS) is also developed based on fault tree analysis while considering major 
shipping accidents such as collisions, powered grounding, drift grounding, foundering 
and fire and explosions by Fowler and Sørgård (2000). Danish institution COWI 
(2008) proposed formal safety assessment (FSA) methodology for sea traffic taking 
into account collisions and groundings. Martins and Maturana (2010) applied fault tree 
analysis to assess the collision and grounding probability using FSA method. Zaman 
et al. (2014) estimated the risk of collision in the Malacca Strait using the FSA 
approach. Merrick et al. (2000) developed a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
technique considering expert judgment to assess the accident risk in the Prince William 
Sound. Van Dorp et al. (2001) developed maritime accident event chain which 
included collision, grounding and fire/explosion using the available data combining 
with expert judgment. Montewka et al. (2010) proposed a geometrical model to assess 
the likelihood of ship collisions. A collision probability model based on Monte Carlo 
simulation technique was developed by Goerlandt and Kujala (2011). Later, it was 
used in evaluating the risk of tanker collisions in the Gulf of Finland (Goerlandt et al., 
2011). A probabilistic approach was proposed to assess the risk and sustainability 
associated with ship collision by Dong and Frangopol (2014). Goerlandt et al. (2015) 
developed a ship collision alert system to measure ship collision risk based on fuzzy 
approach and expert elicitation. Banda et al. (2015) visualised the accident risks 
through a hazard identification model in the Finnish-Swedish winter navigation 
system. Sormunen et al. (2015) investigated chemical tanker collision as a case study 
by taking into account data uncertainties. Montewka et al. (2014) proposed BN 
framework for ship-ship collisions in the open sea, evaluated the probabilities of these 
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events and finally, determined the severity of a collision. Goerlandt and Montewka 
(2015) developed a Bayesian network model and applied it to a case study of the oil 
spill from a tanker to quantify the risk. Mazaheri et al. (2016) proposed an evidence-
based and expert-supported Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) for assessing the 
probability of ship-grounding accidents. Fu et al. (2016) developed a causal 
probabilistic model to predict the probability of a ship stuck in ice in the Arctic waters 
using the BBNs. In this causal model, a set of input parameters such as hydro-
meteorological conditions (air temperature, ice concentration, ice thickness, sea 
temperature, wave height and wind speed) along the analysed route were considered. 
Khan et al. (2017) proposed an Object-Oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN) model to 
predict ship-ice collision probability considering navigational, operating and human 
factors.  
3.1.2.   Discussion on existing accident models 
Most of the studies discussed above focused on a single accident (Dong and Frangopol, 
2014; Fu et al., 2016; Fujii and Shiobara, 1971; Goerlandt and Kujala, 2011; Goerlandt 
and Montewka, 2015; Khan et al., 2017; Mazaheri et al., 2016; Montewka et al., 2014; 
Montewka et al., 2010; Pedersen, 1995; Rosqvist et al., 2002; Sormunen et al., 2015; 
Zaman et al., 2014) or combined ship accidents (Banda et al., 2015; COWI, 2008; 
Fowler and Sørgård, 2000; Macduff, 1974; Martins and Maturana, 2010; Merrick et 
al., 2000; Van Dorp et al., 2001) and modelling (individual or integrated) of different 
types of accidents in maritime traffic. However, integrated accident models based on 
different types of accidents for the NSR are quite limited. Recorded data of wave height 
and wind speed for the NSR are never considered in the literature or accident analysis. 
Thus, conventional ship accident models developed for Arctic regions may not address 
the integrated accident events such as ice-ship collision, foundering and grounding, 
57 
 
simultaneously considering recorded data of five sea states. The conventional risk 
analysis approaches are commonly adopted to identify the propagation of primary 
causes that may lead to the potential accident consequences. In the quantitative risk 
analysis, fault tree is used to estimate the probabilities of possible causes of an event 
and event tree is used to model potential consequences of that event (Meel and Seider, 
2006). Additionally, fault trees may be used to find the logical relationship between 
the primary causes and the potential consequences. However, in this study, BNs are 
favoured over fault tree analysis due to advantages such as conditional dependency 
between primary causes and consequences, common cause issues between the linked 
nodes, the addition of new accident prior probability as well as updating the real-time 
posterior probability in the model. The advantage of the integrated method is its 
capability to predict the particular accident considering the environmental and 
operational factors. This helps to define the accident according to the existing 
conditions and to take the appropriate mitigative measures to decrease the 
consequences in advance which enhances overall reliability of the shipping operations.        
 
In reality, it is possible to have an ice-ship or ship-ship collision which may lead to a 
ship sinking. Ship stuck in ice may lead to damage to the ship's hull and result in a 
capsizing accident.  However, in the proposed model latter impact of collision or 
grounding is not considered, with only the causes behind the collision, foundering and 
grounding and the individual accident probabilities considered. The aim is to show the 
likelihood of each accident considering most possible causes. It is possible to connect 
arcs between accident events and show further impact due to those accidents. 
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The present study aims to develop a novel methodology by using the BN to represent 
different potential accident scenarios considering the particular environmental and 
operational conditions to quantify the risk of transit on Arctic routes. Using BNs, the 
probabilities of three possible accident types on Arctic routes are quantified based on 
primary causes and their associated probabilities. The methodology relies on historical 
data and expert judgments in the estimation of the probability distributions of primary 
events. The primary objective is to reduce the risk of environmental damage to a 
minimal level caused by ship collisions, while continuously striving to further reduce 
the risk. Three different accident scenarios that are likely to occur during Arctic transit 
are studied. A case study which exemplifies the application of the developed 
methodology is also presented. 
3.2.   Bayesian networks 
A  BN is a specific type of graphical model that is represented as a directed acyclic 
graph where the nodes represent random variables and directed arcs imply local 
conditional dependencies between parent and child nodes (Ghahramani, 1998; Jensen 
and Nielsen, 2007; Mihajlovic and Petkovic, 2001; Neapolitan, 2003; Pearl, 1988). In 
BN, the network structure, the graph, can be observed as a qualitative part of the model, 
whereas the probability parameters add a quantitative extent to the model (Darwiche, 
2009). The joint probability distribution of a set of random variables  1 ,..., nU A A
based on the conditional independence and the chain rule (Pearl, 1988), is included in 
the network as: 
1
( ) ( | ( ))
n
i i
i
P U P A Pa A

                                                                                              (3-1) 
where P(U) denotes the joint probability distribution of variables and Pa (Ai) as the 
parent set of variable Ai. Accordingly, the probability of Ai is calculated as: 
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P A P U                                                                                                              (3-2) 
where the summation is taken over all the variables except Ai. A simple BN with a set 
of dependent random variables Ai is illustrated in Figure 3–1 and the corresponding 
joint probability distribution as: 1 2 3 1 2 1 3 1 2( , , ) ( ) ( | ) ( | , )P A A A P A P A A P A A A   . 
 
Figure 3–1: A typical Bayesian network representing A1 as root node; A2 as intermediate node; 
and A3 as leaf node.   
 
Bayes theorem is used in the BN to update the occurrence probability (prior) of events 
given new observations, called evidence E, to yield the consequence probability 
(posterior) using the following equation:  
( , ) ( , )
( | )
( ) ( , )
U
P U E P U E
P U E
P E P U E
 

               (3-3) 
BNs are favoured over conventional probabilistic techniques as they offer advantages 
such as (i) BN can be used to model accident scenarios and determine the probabilities 
of different scenarios using accident prior information; (ii) BN considers the 
dependency and conditionality of the primary causes and consequences (Jensen and 
Nielsen, 2007); (iii) the accident information can be updated at any time using the real 
system data, and (iv) adding a new piece of information in BN requires only a small 
number of directed edges in addition to a small number of probabilities (Pearl, 1988). 
BN is a promising method for risk analysis of large and complex systems due to its 
flexible structure and probabilistic reasoning engine (Khakzad et al., 2013b). For 
example, Hänninen and Kujala (2012) evaluated the ship-ship collision causation 
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model which consists of 100 nodes and 179 links. The application of BN to quantitative 
risk analysis of offshore drilling operations and marine and offshore accident analysis 
has previously been discussed by researchers (Baksh et al., 2017; Baksh et al., 2015; 
Baksh et al., 2016; Hänninen and Kujala, 2012; Khan et al., 2017; Li et al., 2012; 
Mazaheri et al., 2016; Montewka et al., 2014; Zhang and Thai, 2016; Zhang et al., 
2016). BN model is established based on unwanted events by addressing potential 
primary causes leading to the unwanted events (ship collision, foundering and 
grounding in this study), and exploring the possible consequences resulting from the 
unwanted event. 
3.3.   Proposed methodology for ship accidents in harsh environments 
In this study, a BN reasoning process has been developed to provide a natural 
framework for maritime risk analysis in Arctic transit. A flowchart of the proposed 
approach is shown in Figure 3–2 to ensure a step-by-step systematic process. The entire 
methodology consists of four steps. GeNIe is used as the robust BN programming 
environment for the risk modelling and its probability calculations.  
 
A brief explanation of each step of the modelling process is given in the following 
paragraphs. 
Step 1: This step heavily relies on historical data and subject-matter experts (SMEs) 
judgments from the potential sources, such as databases, tests, experiments, 
simulations, networks and analytical models (Fowler and Sørgård, 2000; Fujii and 
Shiobara, 1971; Macduff, 1974; Tabri et al., 2009). Any observed data that is available 
from a specific scenario can be used to update or refine the estimates of previous 
accident data. In this way, uncertainties and limitations can be reduced in respect of 
new data or SMEs judgement.  
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Figure 3–2: Developed risk-based methodology for risk analysis in Arctic transit. 
 
Step 2: In this step of the process, the potential accident scenarios (e.g., the collision 
of a ship with Arctic ice during Arctic transits has been taken into consideration) and 
associated consequences (foundering and grounding) that can occur in a harsh 
environment are identified. For example, grounding may occur due to a failure of any 
of the sub-events (e.g., harsh weather effect, the faults of vessels, navigation failures, 
visibility issues and tug assistance failure). Further, sub-events such as the fault of the 
vessel itself can be defined as anchor failure, loss of power in the danger area, or loss 
of propulsion of the vessel.  
 
Step 3: In this step in constructing the BN, the graphical representation is crucial as it 
indicates the relevant variables (nodes) and dependencies (arcs). It helps to determine 
the level of detail that needs to be used in subsequent models. Also, it provides the 
reasoning for analysing and communicating causal assumptions, which is not easy to 
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express using standard mathematical notation (Pearl, 2000). For example, if there are 
two events A and B (A as a cause event and B as an effect event), these two events can 
be labelled and mapped into the network. An arc can be placed between an influencing 
node (parent) and an influenced node (child) to determine influence relationships 
between these nodes (Eleye-Datubo et al., 2006). The terminating arrow of the arcs 
can be set to point to the child nodes.   
 
Step 4: In this step, a set of input parameters based on environmental and operational 
conditions are assigned. The BN is used to show the causal relationship between the 
linked nodes. The Bayesian inference consists of computing the conditional 
probabilities with the BN; that is, to specify the states for each child node and input 
values for parent nodes in a conditional probability table (CPT). Prior evidence can be 
entered into the model by manually setting probabilities in the network. The Bayesian 
inference is enabled via the Bayes formula. Once the prior information is provided in 
the directed graph, the entered evidence propagates in both directions. The updating 
belief is computed after prior evidence is entered to improve the prior knowledge, and 
thus the prior probability values, are updated by calculating posterior probabilities. At 
any part of the analysis, if it is required to see the contribution of different factors in 
the causation of an accident, backward analysis can be considered. Regarding newly 
available data, the calculated posterior probabilities can be considered as the new prior 
probabilities for future risk assessment. BN simulation software GeNIe is used to 
estimate the posterior probabilities as well as updating the prior knowledge. 
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3.3.1.   Accident probability analysis: scenario-based modelling 
In this accident scenario modelling, the collision of a ship with Arctic ice during Arctic 
transits has been taken into consideration. The characteristics of Arctic transits and 
environments are different and unique compared to local waterways. Therefore, 
particular factors might have a significant influence on the risk associated with marine 
navigation in the Arctic waters, such as pack ice effect, environmental obstacles, the 
combined effect of wind and wave, and emergency assistance. However, detailed 
investigations of Arctic routes are out of the scope of the present study. Most vessels 
sailing through the NSR will require icebreaker escort (ABS, 2014). In this accident 
scenario, it is anticipated that an icebreaker escorts a ship by making channels in the 
ice. Icebreaker escort is required when the vessel’s capability to navigate or manoeuvre 
is severely restricted by existing ice conditions. There are two main methods of 
escorting in ice – leading and towing. In both cases the escorted vessel follows the ice 
channel made by the escorting icebreaker or icebreakers. The failure of the icebreaker 
to remove ice may affect ship navigation which can result in an ice-ship collision. 
Furthermore, the risk of collision between the vessel and icebreaker needs to be 
considered, particularly if the icebreaker comes to a sudden stop and should not 
hesitate to decrease speed or stop at immediate notice. As the traffic on the NSR may 
increase in future decades, another marine vessel’s fault can be considered in ship-to-
ship collision scenarios. 
 
Different consequences can take place regarding a ship collision. If it is an oil tanker, 
the breach in the vessel’s hull can propagate a massive spill of hydrocarbons into the 
sea with the impact being significant damage to the marine environment, economic 
losses as well as a costly recovering process (Dave and Ghaly, 2011; Goerlandt et al., 
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2012b). The release of hydrocarbons may subsequently lead to different credible 
accidents such as vapour cloud explosion (VCE) and pool fire (Assael and Kakosimos, 
2010; Baksh et al., 2017; Baksh et al., 2016; CCPS, 1994; Crowl, 2010). The 
consequences are inevitable and may cause many fatalities and the loss of the entire 
vessel if the release of hydrocarbons and fire cannot be controlled and extinguished 
promptly (Dave and Ghaly, 2011). In harsh and cold environments, emergency 
responses and evacuation procedures are always challenging for rescue vessels and the 
crews as they may be delayed due to maneuvering through ice-covered waters (Verny 
and Grigentin, 2009). These factors may also lead to severe consequences on Arctic 
routes and need to be considered in the consequent analysis of ship accidents. Due to 
the potential consequences caused by the cold and harsh environment, it is vital to 
identify the future risk of ship collision with regards to the increase in ship traffic in 
this region (Balto, 2014). The geographical map of the northern transport corridor in 
the  Arctic region is taken from the Arctic portal (Arctic-Portal, 2017) with the route 
through five seas drawn with a  dotted line as illustrated in Figure 3–3. 
 
Figure 3–3: The northern transport corridor with ice and water. 
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3.3.2.   Dynamic ice-ship collision modelling on the NSR 
Dynamic risk assessment method takes advantage of case scenario data and updating 
mechanisms to reassess the risk regarding new information (Khakzad et al., 2012). In 
Bayesian updating approach, new data are employed in the form of likelihood 
functions to update prior probabilities using Bayes’ theorem (Kalantarnia et al., 2009; 
Kanes et al., 2017; Kelly, 2011; Meel and Seider, 2006). In this present work, a 
dynamic risk-based model is developed to analyse shipping accidents on the NSR and 
reduce the risk of accidents. The model is capable of updating the results whenever 
new evidence is available during the operation. Although the time slice is not 
considered within the model, the observations (e.g., new data) however, can be a 
function of time. 
 
The proposed model will estimate the collision, foundering and grounding probability 
considering harsh environmental conditions and would be suitable for Arctic region 
transits. In the proposed model, a ship collision with ice in the Arctic region plays a 
central role. However, it is recognised that accident type, such as ship foundering and 
grounding, also has the potential to take place. Therefore, while the development of 
ship collision model is in progress, two other accident types, viz. foundering and 
grounding are also taken into consideration. A digital chart error leads the USS 
Guardian to misplace the actual location of a reef by about eight nautical miles and 
resulted in grounding on that reef in the Philippines (Couttie, 2013). However, no 
evidence has been found of ship grounding due to digital chart error in the Arctic 
region. This factor is considered due to the USS Guardian tragedy. Quantitative risk 
analysis of a ship accident requires historical data or expert judgment. In case of 
missing or limited historical data (to estimate the probabilities of events), the expert 
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judgment is considered (Lindhe et al., 2009). SMEs judgement is utilised where no 
data are available for a particular type of accident nor the causes of that accident.  
 
In the developed model, three random variables represent ship accidents, such as 
collision, foundering and grounding. Ship collision is directly/indirectly influenced by 
twenty primary nodes and twelve intermediate nodes. Similarly, foundering and 
grounding of a ship are also influenced by seventeen and twenty-two primary nodes, 
respectively. These primary nodes are used as input information for the intermediate 
nodes where given probable causes for ship accident, the likelihood of a collision, 
foundering and grounding, are modelled.  
 
The impact of sea wave height, wind speed and pack ice effect are highly seasonal, 
affecting both navigation and ship transit. This effect can differ in summer or winter. 
In winter, icebreakers prepare the narrow channels in Arctic transit which helps the 
ship to navigate and hence icebreakers impact on ship collision frequency. In the 
developed model, twelve wave states (e.g., Swv1, Swv2, Swv3…, and Swv12) are considered 
which define the wave heights between 0-2 m and are which are profoundly influenced 
by the wind. For the wind, the first eleven states (e.g., Swd1, Swd2, Swd3…, and Swd11) are 
considered to be between 0-28 m/s as per Beaufort scale. For example, in the summer 
season, if the wind speed is in state 6 (8.0-10.7 m/s) which is considered as a fresh 
breeze, the wave height can be in any state (Swv1 – Swv12) for that season. Similarly, 
during winter (December to February) the NSR can be frozen, and therefore high 
waves on the sea are very unusual. The BMT ARGOSS UK provided the recorded data 
for different wave height (Hs) and wind state (u10, 10 m above sea level) for the period 
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January 1979 to December 2015 at 3-hourly time intervals (BMT-ARGOSS, 1979-
2015).  
 
Different wind speed and pack ice together can make for dangerous icing conditions. 
However, in comparison to sea wave height and wind speed, icing condition may 
require a longer time to change from its original state. According to the Meteorological 
Institute, icing from sea spray will occur at temperatures below -2°C and with wind 
speeds more than 11 m/s. Due to the slower formation of sea spray icing and rare,  
changing conditions, different types of pack ice such as very close pack ice, close pack 
ice, open pack ice and very open pack ice, respectively can be observed (OCIMF, 
2014). The detailed characteristics of the sea ice types have been discussed by previous 
researchers (Balto, 2014; Bourke and Garrett, 1987; Kum and Sahin, 2015; OCIMF, 
2014; Thelma, 2010; Zakrzewski, 1986).  
 
In this study, BNs are used to synthesise expert judgment and recorded data obtained 
from previous research to perform the integrated analysis. The BN is constructed by 
primary and intermediate nodes with connected arcs. These nodes have two states only, 
each with some probability. For instance, “Ice-breakers failure” can be “Yes” or “No”, 
and the probability of the “Yes” or “No” can be determined by historical statistical 
data.  The intermediate nodes are affected by associated primary causes. For instance, 
the intermediate node “Visibility issues” can be affected by the node “Human factor 
failure”, “Radar failure”, and “Environmental obstacles”. Here, “Human factor failure” 
consists of a variety of sub-groups of errors, which can be the intended or unintended 
action of a human. These sub-groups are defined as human performance influencing 
factors (PIFs) (HSE, 2017). For example, interpretation failure, fatigue/sleeplessness, 
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and/or alcohol abuse can be combined with a human factor failure (Uğurlu et al., 2015). 
On the otherhand, human error is considered as an action or decision which was 
unintended (HSE, 2017). It should be noted that both of these factors are considered 
as human errors in many available literatures. However, to differentiate these factors 
in the developed BN, human error is considered as a single action on failure to detect 
ice and iceberg using conventional marine radars and thermal imaging cameras while 
navigating on the NSR. However, considering all the PIFs would make the accident 
modelling network complex enough to show the general applicability for mariners. 
Rather, integrating too many sub-factors (contributors to the accidents) into the main 
factor, the human error and the human factor are considered in the proposed model. 
Taking advantage of the BN, an unwanted event (e.g., collision, foundering, or 
grounding) is defined and then decomposed to determine its environmental and 
operational events. The developed BNs for ship collision, foundering, and grounding 
accident scenarios are illustrated in section 3.4.2. 
3.4.   Application of the methodology: case study 
The application of the proposed method is applied to a case study of a ship collision, 
navigating on the NSR, to estimate the accident probability. The extreme temperature, 
pack ice, and multi-year sea ice effect and severe climate changes are some of the 
drawbacks of this region (Kassens, 1994; Melling, 2002; OCIMF, 2014; Thelma, 2010; 
US-Navy, 1988; Zakrzewski, 1986). These areas are entirely covered with ice during 
winter and partly covered in summer. According to Johannessen et al. (1997), the 
presence of multi-year ice on the NSR creates a dangerous environment for marine 
operations, which subsequently necessitates a more comprehensive method and study 
to investigate navigational risk and challenges in the harsh and cold environments 
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through the NSR. In the following sections, the application of the proposed 
methodology is applied to a case study of a ship collision navigating through the NSR. 
3.4.1.   The NSR economic viabilities and the associated risk 
The Soviet Union developed the NSR shipping route as a major national waterway 
which has a history of 1306 voyages completed by 331 vessels in 1987 (Ellis and 
Brigham, 2009). In recent years, the Arctic Ocean has become the dominant hotspot 
due to its natural resources, shorter navigational routes and pirate free zone. Fossil fuel 
is a major attraction in Europe to manage the increasing demand for energy. A 
combined initiative between the NSR and the European explorer is undergoing the 
extraction of fossil fuel in the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea and the Yamal Peninsula 
(Pastusiak, 2016; Peresypkin and Yakovlev, 2008). Another growing interest in the 
eastern region of the NSR for East Asian countries such as Japan and China is the 
transport of fossil fuel to meet its energy demand (Pastusiak, 2016). An experimental 
voyage between Yokohama and Kirkenes in 1995 proved the NSR to be a cost-
effective route compared to the Suez and Panama Canals shortening the travel time by 
15 days and reducing transportation costs by up to $500,000 (Pastusiak, 2016). The 
NSR would connect the ports of North Asia (Japan, South Korea, and China) and 
north-western Europe (Hamburg, Bremen, and Rotterdam) and shorten the journey 
length by about 2500 nautical miles (Verny and Grigentin, 2009). After opening a new 
container terminal for Europe and Asia, cargo shipping increased on the NSR after 
2010, exceeding 3.87 million tonnes of cargo in 2012 and expecting a future increase 
to more than 5.0 million tons by 2019 (Lammers, 2010; Pastusiak, 2016; Polovinkin 
and Fomichev, 2012). According to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) 
2009 report, the estimated volume of oil and gas transportation on the NSR is expected 
to be about 40 million tons per year by 2020 (Ellis and Brigham, 2009). More economic 
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aspects of Arctic transportation can be found in the literature (Ellis and Brigham, 2009; 
Hong, 2012; Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011; Pastusiak, 2016).   
 
The NSR consists of the ship sailing routes between the Bering Strait in the east and 
the Barents Sea in the west (Johannessen et al., 2007). It connects north-western 
Europe and north-eastern Asia and is considered the shortest sailing route. The NSR is 
divided into five regions identified as the Chukchi Sea, East Siberian Sea, Laptev Sea, 
Kara Sea, and the Barents Sea. According to a 50-year series of data from polar stations 
in these regions and visual observations in open sea areas, it has been observed that ice 
formation begins in late August in the northern East Siberian Sea whereas, young ice 
formation starts in the first ten days of September north of the Kara and Laptev Seas 
(Johannessen et al., 2007). According to Johannessen et al. (2007), young ice appears 
at the end of the second 10 days of September north of the Chukchi and the Barents 
Seas. Zakharov (1997) presents an estimate of the average ice area in the NSR regions 
during March and September as described in Table 3-1. On average within 35-40 days, 
the Laptev and East Siberian Seas are entirely covered by young ice whereas it takes 
about 80-85 days for the Kara and Chukchi Seas (Johannessen et al., 2007). The 
Chukchi Sea has an area of 6.20E05 km2 with an average depth of 80 m and is 
considered as the only route from the Pacific to the Arctic. According to Table 3-1, an 
average area of 5.95E-01 million km2 of the Chukchi Sea is ice covered in March and 
1.96E-01 million km2 in September.  
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Table 3-1: Average ice area (million km2) in the marginal seas of the NSR regions during the 
period of the seasonal maximum (March) and minimum (September) (Zakharov, 1997). 
Sea March 
(million km2) 
September 
(million km2) 
Seasonal 
Changes (%) 
Chukchi 5.95E-01 1.96E-01 67 
East Siberian 7.70E-01 5.16E-01 33 
Kara 8.30E-01 2.66E-01 68 
Laptev 5.36E-01 1.96E-01 63 
Barents 8.55E-01 1.28E-01 85 
 
According to Anderson et al. (2011), the East Siberian Sea has a surface area of 
8.95E05 km2 with a mean depth of 52 m which is the shallowest amongst the seas on 
the NSR. Harsh environment, remote areas, and unexplored maritime areas are some 
of the characteristics of this region that create challenges for navigational purposes 
(Münchow et al., 1999). During the winter season, the mean temperature is -30oC 
(Mulherin et al., 1994) and the entire area is ice-covered.  However, during summer, 
50% of the ice remains. According to the AMSA 2009 report, the entire coastal region 
along the eastern NSR becomes shallow for all marine operations due to the average 
depth of the Chukchi Sea and East Siberian Sea (Ellis and Brigham, 2009). The Laptev 
Sea has an area of 6.50E05 km2. The average wind speed above the sea surface water 
is 5 m/s, and storms occur in the sea, three to four times a month. Also, fog is frequent 
in this region, and the humidity varies between 95-98% (Fofonova, 2012). The Kara 
Sea has the second highest surface area of 8.80E05 km2 along the NSR with a mean 
depth of 110 m (Galimov et al., 2006). The Barents Sea has the smallest surface area 
of 1.40E06 km2 with a mean depth of 230 m (Sakshaug, 1997; Smedsrud et al., 2010). 
The winter is considered to be December to February in the Barents Sea when sea ice 
is relatively thin compared to other regions of the Arctic Ocean. According to a report 
by Thelma (2010), in extreme conditions, spray and mist can build up four centimetres 
of ice per hour on the surface of a device in the Northern Barents Sea. The summer 
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season provides an excellent opportunity for marine transportation as the entire Barents 
Sea becomes ice-free (Sakshaug, 1997). 
 
Maritime transportation poses risks regarding possible accidents resulting in loss of 
life and ship’s cargo as well as detrimental impacts on the marine environment. The 
accidents on the NSR are comparatively lower than some other regions. The AMSA 
2009 report highlighted incidents and accidents which occurred in the Arctic region 
between 1995-2004. According to the report, 293 vessels of different categories were 
engaged in several accidents including 22 collisions, 68 groundings and 54 damages 
to the vessel (Ellis and Brigham, 2009). Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
(MAIB) recorded 65 incidents/accidents between 1993 and 2011 in the Arctic region 
(Kum and Sahin, 2015). However, only four collisions and four groundings were 
reported to the MAIB compared to 22 collisions and 68 groundings (Kum and Sahin, 
2015). According to Safety and Shipping Review 2014, there were about seven 
casualties (groundings) in the Arctic region (Review, 2014). Another safety and 
shipping review in 2016 reported 71 shipping incidents in the Arctic waters during 
2015 (Review, 2016). Growing traffic in the Arctic region may increase the risk of 
ship operations. 
3.4.2.   Accident scenario analysis 
The cold and harsh environmental conditions have made the Arctic waters mostly 
inaccessible as a shipping route. Various factors that can affect the ship’s navigation, 
as well as human performance in emergency situations such as wave height, wind 
speed, sea current, surrounding temperature harsh weather effect, and different level 
of ice along the NSR route, are taken into consideration. However, there are some 
variations between the values of the environmental factors being identified. Until 
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today, no particular factors have been considered to divide the NSR into different 
regions. Hence, this route is divided based on the five different seas, the Chukchi Sea, 
East Siberian Sea, Laptev Sea, the Kara Sea and the Barents Sea respectively.  
 
In this accident scenario analysis, the collision, foundering and grounding probabilities 
of an oil tanker and the primary causes of these consequences are adopted from 
previous literature (Antão and Soares, 2006; EMSA, 2009; Noroozi et al., 2014; 
Trucco et al., 2008; Uğurlu et al., 2015; Yeo et al., 2016) on ship accident modelling 
in normal conditions. SMEs are being considered if the probability of primary causes 
specific to Arctic environments is not available. 
 
The severe climate in Arctic regions requires experts to re-evaluate the previous ship 
accident scenarios when defining the probabilities of the primary causes in this study. 
The five experts who have more than ten years of research and industry experience in 
shipping operations (on deck) and are familiar with the Arctic routes environment have 
been selected to assign the probabilities of the root causes.  These experts were male 
and aged between 35 and 65 (the average age being 51.6). All the experts have their 
Bachelor (BSc), and Master (MSc) degrees in maritime-related fields. Two experts 
were working as a master, two as chief-officer, and one as second-officer in Canadian 
Transport Agency with little or no knowledge of assessment of probabilities. All 
experts were Canadian and spoke fluent English. These experts were engaged in 
defining the probability distributions of primary events for each region. The average is 
the arithmetic mean value for the primary events. The corresponding mean values of 
probabilities for each primary event for each specific region on the NSR are presented 
in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2: Mean value of probabilities for primary causes of ship collision, foundering and grounding received from historical data and SMEs judgement. 
 
Basic events Chukchi Sea East Siberian 
Sea 
Laptev Sea Kara Sea Barents Sea Data source 
Index Event Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5  
X1 Human factor failure 2.97E-04 3.50E-03 1.30E-03 4.00E-04 3.00E-04 SME 
X2 Radar failure 2.04E-04 4.00E-04 2.00E-04 5.30E-04 3.50E-04 SME 
X3 Environmental obstacles 4.33E-04 2.30E-04 1.90E-04 3.50E-04 2.90E-04 SME 
X4 Mechanical failure 6.71E-05 6.00E-05 5.50E-05 5.00E-05 5.50E-05 SME 
X5 Operational failure 2.54E-05 3.54E-05 2.14E-05 2.11E-05 2.90E-05 SME 
X6 Contaminated fuel in bunker tanks 3.00E-05 2.10E-05 1.30E-05 1.90E-05 1.30E-05 SME 
X7 Contaminated fuel measuring system fail 3.30E-05 5.30E-05 4.10E-05 3.10E-05 4.30E-05 SME 
X8 Engine fails to operate 2.04E-04 3.00E-04 2.34E-04 5.30E-04 3.30E-04 SME 
X9 Basic failure of the propeller 2.03E-04 2.30E-04 3.00E-04 4.03E-04 3.00E-04 SME 
X10 Power failure 3.50E-04 5.00E-04 4.10E-04 3.30E-04 4.50E-03 SME 
X11 Back-up power failure 1.54E-04 1.74E-04 1.59E-04 1.74E-04 1.66E-04 SME 
X12 Map location not updated 1.04E-04 5.30E-04 2.11E-04 3.00E-05 1.01E-04 SME 
X13 Digital chart error 3.52E-04 3.30E-04 3.00E-04 5.30E-04 4.00E-04 SME 
X14 Navigator malfunction 4.48E-05 4.00E-05 3.50E-05 7.00E-05 3.00E-05 SME 
X15 Inappropriate route selection 1.62E-04 3.30E-04 2.00E-04 2.09E-04 3.00E-04 SME 
X16 Procedure failure 2.66E-04 1.35E-04 4.00E-04 3.00E-04 3.30E-04 SME 
X17 Wind speed See Table 3.6 See Table 3.6 See Table 3.6 See Table 3.6 See Table 3.6 (BMT-ARGOSS) 
X18 Wave height See Table 3.7 See Table 3.7 See Table 3.7 See Table 3.7 See Table 3.7 (BMT-ARGOSS) 
X19 Pack ice 5.30E-03 3.00E-03 3.70E-03 1.00E-03 1.00E-04 SME 
X20 Human error 1.60E-03 3.50E-03 1.30E-03 4.00E-04 3.00E-04 SME 
X21 Ridge ice and iceberg 3.00E-04 5.00E-04 3.00E-04 5.00E-04 1.00E-04 SME 
X22 Non-detected multi-layer ice 5.10E-04 3.00E-04 5.00E-04 4.00E-04 3.00E-04 SME 
X23 Fault of other vessels 3.00E-05 5.00E-05 1.00E-05 5.00E-05 1.00E-05 SME 
X24 Ice-breakers failure 2.23E-05 7.30E-04 5.30E-04 2.00E-04 1.30E-04 SME 
X25 Insufficient tugboat use 2.09E-04 2.34E-04 3.30E-04 2.30E-04 1.01E-04 SME 
X26 Faulty tugboat manoeuvre 6.71E-05 1.35E-04 3.50E-04 3.00E-04 2.31E-04 SME 
X27 Not tight enough 6.50E-04 7.00E-04 6.90E-04 6.10E-04 7.00E-04 SME 
X28 Structural failure 5.50E-04 6.00E-04 6.00E-04 5.10E-04 5.50E-04 SME 
X29 Waterline reaches door 3.33E-04 4.33E-04 4.13E-04 4.03E-04 4.00E-04 SME 
X30 Inadequate pumping 4.30E-05 4.90E-05 5.30E-05 5.10E-05 4.99E-05 SME 
X31 Leaking 5.50E-04 4.00E-04 5.50E-04 5.00E-04 4.60E-04 SME 
X32 Communication failure 6.50E-04 7.00E-04 6.10E-04 6.50E-04 6.90E-04 SME 
X33 Faulty design 9.00E-04 1.30E-04 1.10E-04 9.90E-04 1.10E-04 SME 
X34 Excessive wear 4.50E-04 6.00E-04 5.70E-04 5.10E-04 5.50E-04 SME 
X35 Metal failure 6.00E-04 4.50E-04 5.50E-04 5.10E-04 4.90E-04 SME 
X36 Cargo shift failure 4.13E-04 4.03E-04 4.33E-04 4.00E-04 4.11E-04 SME 
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In this study, most of the input data for the BN analysis in each particular region is 
received from experts. Based on the prior event probabilities assigned by the SMEs, 
human error effect on the detection failure is recognised as one of the recurrent causal 
factors for marine ship collision. Previous research suggests that about 74% or more 
of such accidents involve human error related factors (Rothblum et al., 2002). The cold 
temperature in a freezing environment can challenge the mariners which in turn may 
affect surveillance, reaction times, awareness and memory recall, and physical strength 
(Enander, 1987; Hoffman, 2002; HSE, 2017; Khan et al., 2017; Macrae, 2009; 
Musharraf et al., 2013; Noroozi et al., 2014). Vessel’s collision with pack ice and non-
detected ice is also considered as another significant factor by the experts in developing 
the model.  
 
The present study is based on sea wave measurements from the NSR. The 
measurements were obtained from BMT ARGOSS UK. In BMT ARGOSS, global 
wind and wave hindcast dataset are available on a grid of spatial resolution 0.5o by 
0.5o. The wind and wave parameters were recorded at each grid point, at 3-hourly time 
intervals, for the period January 1979 to December 2015. The recorded data provided 
by BMT ARGOSS UK consists of significant wave height, Hs (m), zero crossing wave 
period, Tz (s) and wind speed measured at 10 m above the surface. A sample of 
recorded data is shown in Table 3-3.  
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Table 3-3: Sample recorded data of wave parameters from the Barents Sea. 
Dataset Hs (m) Tz (s) U10 (m/s) 
1 0.0024 2.8807 1.410116968 
2 0.0032 2.8610 0.811585809 
3 0.0047 2.8408 0.944581146 
4 0.0051 1.7879 2.463794632 
5 0.0064 1.8343 2.696691548 
6 0.0065 1.8362 2.723586755 
.. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. 
105127 11.3459 11.2784 19.34842017 
105128 11.8528 11.3321 19.15760045 
 
A wave is defined as the fraction of a record between two successive zero up crossings 
(MHL, 2016). In practice, a zero up crossing wave period is considered to occur when 
the surface passes through the mean line in an upward direction (Tann, 1976). It is the 
portion of the record between adjacent zero up-crossings. Its height, H is equal to the 
vertical distance between the highest and lowest point of the wave. Zero crossing wave 
presented in Figure 3–4 is adapted from MHL (2016). Wave data are usually collected 
for approx. 20 minutes on each 3rd or 6th hours assuming stable sea states (Skjong et 
al., 1995). Wave data can be obtained by visual observations from lighthouses, 
merchant ships and weather ships, however, instrumental observations can be used 
such as wave buoys, radars, shipborne wave recorders (SBWR), lasers, satellites and 
surface-piercing instruments (Skjong et al., 1995; Wang et al., 2015a). According to 
the World Meteorological Organization, (WMO, 1983), wave data accuracy 
requirements are:  
 20% for significant wave height and  1.0s for the average wave period.  
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Figure 3–4: Zero crossing wave period. 
 
According to Tann (1976), significant wave height, (Hs) is defined as the mean height 
of the highest third of the waves. Given 3N zero up-crossing wave period, the 
significant height is, 
2 1 3
1
( .... )S N NH H H
N
                   (3-4) 
where the heights H1, ………., H3N are arranged in increasing order (crest to trough 
heights were used in early research). 
 
The period of a zero-up crossing wave is defined as the time interval between the two 
zero up crossings which bound it. Given a record of duration t minutes, the mean zero 
up crossing period is defined as, 
60
sec
No. of zero up crossing waves on the record
Z
t
T


            (3-5) 
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A set of wind and wave data (Total 105128 observations) for the years January 1979 
to December 2015 has been obtained based on observations at each grid point for the 
area of interest from BMT ARGOSS. Linear contour plot in Figure 3–5 is plotted using 
the recorded data from the observations of wave height Hs (m) against wave period, Tz 
(s) for each sea. The wave data of the Barents Sea is presented as a scatter diagram in 
Table 3-4. The wind speed measured at 10 m above sea level for the Barents Sea is 
also displayed as a scatter diagram in Table 3-5. 
 
 
Figure 3–5: Linear contour plot of wave height data for each region on the NSR. 
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Table 3-4: Scatter diagram for observations of significant wave height and zero-up-crossing period of Barents Sea. 
Sign. 
Wave 
Ht. (m) 
Interval of zero-up-crossing period (s) 
0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.9 
5.0 
5.9 
6.0 
6.9 
7.0 
7.9 
8.0 
8.9 
9.0 
9.9 
10.0 
10.9 
11.0 
11.9 
12.0 
12.9 
0 – 0.9 18946 2960 706 225 101 38 31 13 10 0 
1.0 – 1.9 9084 21487 5048 857 170 58 24 4 6 2 
2.0 – 2.9 3 3778 13441 2526 430 81 15 0 1 0 
3.0 – 3.9 0 7 2444 5889 812 136 21 1 0 0 
4.0 – 4.9 0 0 18 1916 2068 221 26 5 1 0 
5.0 – 5.9 0 0 0 65 1207 423 55 4 4 0 
6.0 – 6.9 0 0 0 0 98 505 56 2 0 0 
7.0 – 7.9 0 0 0 0 5 109 87 4 0 0 
8.0 – 8.9 0 0 0 0 0 6 68 3 0 0 
9.0 – 9.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 4 2 0 
10.0 – 10.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
11.0 – 11.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
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Table 3-5: Scatter diagram for observations of significant wave height and wind speed of Barents Sea. 
Wind 
Speed (m/s) 
Interval of significant wave height (m) 
0 
0.9 
1.0 
1.9 
2.0 
2.9 
3.0 
3.9 
4.0 
4.9 
5.0 
5.9 
6.0 
6.9 
7.0 
7.9 
8.0 
8.9 
9.0 
9.9 
10.0 
10.9 
11.0 
11.9 
0 – 0.2 50 19 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.3 – 1.5 1348 771 141 35 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.6 – 3.3 5074 2909 606 184 64 26 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3.4 – 5.4 8729 7372 1852 457 126 49 8 1 0 0 0 0 
5.5 – 7.9 6413 13895 4450 1189 367 81 21 2 2 1 0 0 
8.0 – 10.7 1345 9508 7941 2660 757 214 44 9 1 2 0 0 
10.8 – 13.8 70 2107 4483 3372 1598 503 122 35 5 0 0 0 
13.9 – 17.1 1 158 761 1254 1086 646 295 72 15 3 2 0 
17.2 – 20.7 0 1 38 153 232 215 143 70 46 4 0 3 
20.8 – 24.4 0 0 0 5 18 21 26 16 7 10 1 1 
24.5 – 28.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
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The following equation is used to calculate the probability of significant wave height, 
P(Hs) and wind speed, P(u10): 
 
( )s
Number of wave height occurred in each level (e.g., 0~1)
P H
Total Number of wave height that occurred
            (3-6) 
 
10( )
Number of wind occurred in each level (e.g., 0~1)
P u
Total Number of wind that occurred
             (3-7) 
 
The probability distribution of significant wave height, Hs and wind speed, u10 for five 
seas along the NSR are presented in Figure 3–6 and Figure 3–7, respectively. The 
probability distribution of significant wave height, Hs and wind speed, u10 for five seas 
along the NSR are presented in Table 3-6 and, Table 3-7 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3–6: Probability distribution of significant wave height, Hs for five seas along the NSR. 
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Figure 3–7: Probability distribution of wind speed, u10 for five seas along the NSR. 
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Table 3-6: Probability distribution of significant wind speed for five seas.  
Beaufort No. Scale 
Description 
Wind speed 
(m/s) 
Sea 
State 
Chukchi East 
Siberian 
Laptev Kara Barents 
0 Calm 0.0-0.2 S1 2.79E-03 NA 3.02E-03 1.66E-03 7.58E-04 
1 Light Air 0.3-1.5 S2 3.35E-02 2.46E-02 4.03E-02 4.20E-02 2.39E-02 
2 Light Breeze 1.6-3.3 S3 1.12E-01 1.48E-01 1.41E-01 1.43E-01 9.20E-02 
3 Gentle Breeze 3.4-5.4 S4 2.24E-01 3.23E-01 2.77E-01 2.56E-01 1.93E-01 
4 Moderate Breeze 5.5-7.9 S5 2.76E-01 3.24E-01 3.13E-01 2.88E-01 2.74E-01 
5 Fresh Breeze 8.0-10.7 S6 2.12E-01 1.44E-01 1.70E-01 1.85E-01 2.33E-01 
6 Strong Breeze 10.8-13.8 S7 1.07E-01 3.32E-02 4.95E-02 6.89E-02 1.28E-01 
7 Near Gale 13.9-17.1 S8 2.90E-02 2.89E-03 5.90E-03 1.41E-02 4.46E-02 
8 Gale 17.2-20.7 S9 3.88E-03 3.57E-04 4.64E-04 1.71E-03 9.39E-03 
9 Severe Gale 20.8-24.4 S10 2.08E-04 NA NA 2.72E-05 1.09E-03 
10 Storm 24.5-28.4 S11 NA NA NA NA 2.08E-05 
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Table 3-7: Probability distribution of significant wave height for five seas.  
Sea 
State 
Wave height 
(m) 
Chukchi East 
Siberian 
Laptev Kara Barents 
S1 0.0-0.9 4.61E-01 7.92E-01 6.71E-01 5.86E-01 2.39E-01 
S2 1.0-1.9 3.36E-01 1.69E-01 2.55E-01 2.92E-01 3.81E-01 
S3 2.0-2.9 1.33E-01 3.30E-02 6.19E-02 9.70E-02 2.10E-01 
S4 3.0-3.9 5.12E-02 4.67E-03 1.15E-02 2.13E-02 9.66E-02 
S5 4.0-4.9 1.58E-02 1.27E-03 9.94E-04 2.96E-03 4.42E-02 
S6 5.0-5.9 2.56E-03 7.92E-05 6.63E-05 3.26E-04 1.82E-02 
S7 6.0-6.9 1.67E-04 NA NA NA 6.86E-03 
S8 7.0-7.9 NA NA NA NA 2.13E-03 
S9 8.0-8.9 NA NA NA NA 7.99E-04 
S10 9.0-9.9 NA NA NA NA 2.08E-04 
S11 10.0-10.9 NA NA NA NA 3.11E-05 
S12 11.0-11.9 NA NA NA NA 4.15E-05 
 
Through a carefully constructed BN, probability data can be incorporated to model the 
visibility issues, system navigation error, anchor failure, and assistance failure. The 
combined effect of different kinds of ice in Arctic water is recognised as one of the 
leading challenges for navigational purposes. The BN diagram for the integrated model 
of ship collision, foundering and grounding can be developed as illustrated in Figure 
3–8. 
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Figure 3–8: Graphical representation of the Bayesian network model. 
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3.4.3.   Accident probability analysis 
In this study, the potential safety measures to mitigate accidents, such as collision, 
foundering and grounding and their consequences on the NSR are not considered. The 
integrated model will help to predict the occurrence probability of any particular 
accident during ship navigation on the NSR. Different environmental and operational 
conditions based on case-specific scenarios are identified and considered as primary 
causes. By applying prior probabilities to these primary causes in the developed model, 
it is possible to identify most probable accidents that may occur in that region. The 
results presented in this section are obtained by using the BN model illustrated in 
Figure 3–8. The BN analysis demonstrates the highest collision, foundering and 
grounding probabilities to be in region 2 (East Siberian Sea) which are 3.31E-03, 
1.34E-05 and 1.37E-03, respectively (Table 3-8).  
Table 3-8: Accident probabilities of collision, foundering and grounding on the NSR. 
Region Sea Collision Foundering Grounding 
1 Chukchi Sea 1.76E-03 7.75E-06 9.30E-04 
2 East Siberian Sea 3.31E-03 1.34E-05 1.37E-03 
3 Laptev Sea 2.62E-03 8.96E-06 1.15E-03 
4 Kara Sea 2.21E-03 2.43E-06 1.14E-03 
5 Barents Sea 1.30E-03 3.11E-07 1.16E-03 
 
Similarly, region 5 (Barents Sea) has the lowest probability regarding collision (1.30E-
04) and foundering (3.11E-07) events. Region 1 (Chukchi Sea) represents the lowest 
probability (9.30E-04) regarding grounding event. However, due to extreme wind and 
wave effects, collision probability is almost similar in all five seas, and foundering 
probability is higher in region 1 (Chukchi Sea). Likewise, the likelihood of grounding 
event is higher in region 2 (East Siberian Sea). A comparison of collision probabilities 
in extreme and normal condition is presented in Table 3-9.  
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Table 3-9: Risk analysis of ship collision on the NSR in extreme and normal condition 
Regions 
(Sea) 
Conditions 
(Wind and wave effect) 
Collision 
probability 
Region 1 
(Chukchi) 
Extreme 5.03E-03 
Normal 1.76E-03 
Region 2 
(East Siberian) 
Extreme 5.02E-03 
Normal 3.31E-03 
Region 3 
(Laptev) 
Extreme 5.03E-03 
Normal 2.62E-03 
Region 4 
(Kara) 
Extreme 5.01E-03 
Normal 2.21E-03 
Region 5 
(Barents) 
Extreme 5.01E-03 
Normal 1.30E-03 
 
3.4.4.   Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to assess the sensitivity of the BN to some of the 
most critical variables. From Table 3-9, it can be seen that a significant change to 
collision probabilities on the NSR is noticed due to extreme weather condition (severe 
wind and wave effect). Therefore, any increase or decrease in probabilities of wind and 
wave effect are not considered in this sensitivity analysis. The main purpose of this 
study is to determine the factors that mainly contribute to the collision, foundering or 
grounding scenarios. Therefore, for each of the accidental events, a variation to each 
of the nodes that presented a higher contribution to the probability of the main event 
was changed systematically. From the analysis, it can be seen that a significant change 
in the probability of each node can make a difference to the probabilities of collision, 
foundering and grounding. A 10% increase in the initial probability of each node can 
make significant changes to the corresponding accident probability. For collision 
events, the changes take place for most of the nodes. Similar results occurred when 
each of the node probabilities is decreased by the same magnitude. For example, an 
increase of 10% in the probability of pack ice effect, non-detected multi-layer ice, and 
environmental obstacles made changes of 1.61%, 0.15%, and 0.13% in collision 
probability respectively. The results of the variation of the probabilities of the collision 
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events when changing each of the initial node probabilities (Chukchi Sea) are 
presented in Figure 3–9.  
 
Figure 3–9: Sensitivity analysis of collision 
 
Based on the sensitivity analysis, we have ranked the major causes of the collision 
events in the Chukchi Sea, which is shown in Table 3-10. From the table, it has been 
shown that “Pack ice effect”, “Non-detected multi-layer ice”, “Environmental 
obstacles”, “Digital chart error”, “Human factor failure”, “Radar failure” and 
‘Procedure failure” impact significantly on ice-ship collision in the Chukchi Sea. The 
pack ice effect is more significant than the non-detected multi-layer ice in ice-ship 
collision event (1.61% > 0.15 %). Khan et al. (2017) performed a sensitivity analysis 
for the risk factors involved in the ice-oil tanker collision on the NSR and based on the 
analysis ranked environmental conditions at rank 3. Severe environmental conditions 
are the result of high ice and rough weather states.  Wu et al. (2005) considered the 
1.60E-03 1.70E-03 1.80E-03 1.90E-03 2.00E-03 2.10E-03 2.20E-03 2.30E-03
Human factor failure
Radar failure
Environmental obstacles
Map location not updated
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Inappropriate route selection
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Human error
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Fault of other vessels
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Probability of collision
10% increase
10% decrease
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logistics regression model to find determinants of the severity of fishing vessel 
incidents in the Canadian water. The sensitivity analysis from this model showed 
increasing severity due to wave height and ice concentration which can affect the 
stability and mobility of vessels adversely. The above sensitivity analysis allows 
investigating causes of an ice-ship collision in the Chukchi Sea by narrowing down 
major factors.  
Table 3-10: Sensitivity analysis for the risk factors involved in ice-ship collision in the Chukchi 
Sea. 
Ranking Risk Factors 
1 Pack ice effect 
2 Non-detected multi-layer ice 
3 Environmental obstacles 
4 Digital chart error 
5 Human factor failure 
6 Radar failure 
7 Procedure failure 
 
For the cases of foundering event, the effect of pack ice is dominant compared to other 
accident causes with 0.011%. Besides, increase or decrease of the initial probability of 
each node represents very little change in foundering probability. In the case of 
grounding, if the probability of digital chart error is increased or decreased by 10%, 
there is a relative increase or decrease in grounding probability of 3.2% for instance. 
This is an increase from 9.30E-04 to 9.65E-04. Besides digital chart error (Couttie, 
2013), other causes such as out of date map location, navigator malfunction, 
inappropriate route selection and procedure failure may play a more or less significant 
role in accident causation. The above analysis leads to the conclusion that some of the 
nodes are highly dominant in all three types of accidents. 
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3.5.   Conclusion 
The existing transportation accident models consider individual events and 
independent causation factors that may particularly lead to the accidents on the NSR. 
However, very often an accident is the outcome of non-sequential events caused by 
combined effects of different factors. Usually, accidents are time-dependent 
concerning evolving environmental and operational factors. This study focuses on 
developing a dynamic risk-based model to analyse shipping accidents in the Arctic 
waters to reduce the risk of accidents considering particular environmental and 
operational conditions. The developed method takes the advantages of case-specific 
data and updating mechanisms to reassess the risk. In the developed model, ship 
collisions with ice during navigation in Arctic routes were considered. Other accident 
scenarios, such as foundering, and grounding were also considered due to the 
likelihood of their taking place. Application of the developed methodology is reliant 
on BN modelling, due to the need for reassessing ship accident scenarios in Arctic 
transits in different conditions. The risk analysis revealed that the East Siberian Sea 
had the highest probabilities regarding collision, foundering and grounding of the ship. 
Other regions such as Chukchi, Laptev, Kara and the Barents Sea have almost similar 
probabilities regarding grounding. However, foundering probabilities are very low in 
all five areas. The sensitivity analysis of collision, foundering and grounding events 
also revealed that the developed model was sensitive to several environmental and 
operational conditions. From the BN and subsequent sensitivity analysis, it is clear that 
some of the root nodes are the dominant factors towards the accidental event. This 
contribution is the highest for collision and foundering where an increase of the initial 
probability leads to a significant change in the probability of the occurrence of 
accidental events. In the cases of grounding, this effect is less significant. The 
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developed approach can be helpful for decision makers and safety experts to estimate 
the probability of different types of marine ship accidents considering the factors most 
contributing to the existing environmental and operational conditions. The developed 
methodology can be used to investigate the possibility of preventing and mitigating 
ship accidents in harsh and cold environments. 
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Chapter 4:   Dynamic risk model for 
marine vessel collision avoidance in narrow 
channel 
 
The work presented in this chapter has been submitted for review in Ocean 
Engineering. The paper has been edited for inclusion into this thesis to improve 
readability. The citation for this research article is: 
Baksh, A.-A, Abbassi, R., Garaniya, V. and Khan, F. (2018). Dynamic Risk Model for 
Marine Vessel Collision Avoidance in Narrow Channel. Ocean Engineering 
(submitted). 
Abstract 
Avoiding collisions in the port area or narrow channel is a crucial issue for the maritime 
industry. Marine collision avoidance risk model (MCAR) is a framework that uses 
sensors to locate nearby objects and estimate the level of risk, thus warning the 
operator of the vessel to take action to avoid or mitigate a potential collision. The main 
objective of this study is to develop a dynamic risk model for a vessel travelling 
through a narrow traffic way and hence to enable real-time decision-making to avoid 
stationary and non-stationary objects en-route. Five decision-making skills, viz. 
general skill, management training, technical knowledge, emergency response skill 
and sailing experience are considered as an integral part of the study. The proposed 
risk model is developed in Object-Oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN) framework 
considering different operational and environmental factors. The proposed dynamic 
risk model is applied through two case scenarios of the narrow channel. The estimated 
risk provides early warning to take appropriate preventive and mitigative measures to 
avoid a collision thus enhancing the overall safety of shipping operations.    
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4.1.   Introduction 
Collision avoidance is an essential task for any transportation system as well as in 
many other applications. Safety features such as a collision avoidance system (CAS) 
in a vehicle is relatively popular due to its detection capability of a nearby object thus 
alerting the driver to allow prevention of collision (NTSB, 2015). The CAS installed 
on a motor vehicle can sense any moving or non-moving objects in front of the vehicle 
considering object dimension and speed and reacts immediately to possible crash 
hazards by taking action such as alerting the driver and braking automatically. The 
modern car comprises several sensors, front, side and rear to alert the driver when it is 
close to nearby moving/non-moving objects thus avoiding a collision (Takatori and 
Hasegawa, 2006). These sensors are installed to alert the driver to proximity of an 
object allowing vehicle operators to adjust their position and minimise an accident. 
The potential benefits include a reduced number of fatalities and injuries, less severity 
of injuries and the savings of money by preventing potential damage to the vehicle and 
non-fatal injuries (Anderson et al., 2012; Jamson et al., 2008). Automotive insurers 
now even offer up to 20 percent discount on insurance premiums for vehicles equipped 
with such safety features (Anderson et al., 2012). 
 
Modern vessels are equipped with radar, lidar and sensors to detect stationary and non-
stationary objects en-route (Anderson et al., 2012; Jamson et al., 2008; NTSB, 2015; 
Takatori and Hasegawa, 2006; Tran et al., 2002). A moving vessel needs to maintain 
a safe distance from other marine objects, and marine vessels are equipped with the 
latest radar which is suitable for an open area allowing location of nearby objects. 
However, in a confined area or narrow channel, in the presence of stationary or non-
stationary vessel/object, a vessel needs to react immediately to avoid potential collision 
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taking into account vessel kinematics, different operational and environmental factors 
as well as human factors. This issue has been identified, and a possible solution 
proposed, that a ship can be equipped with sensors similar to an auto vehicle. These 
sensors can be installed on the hull to locate proximity of nearby objects in a narrow 
channel and to keep a safe distance, or maintain a significant distance, from other 
stationary or non-stationary objects. Therefore, a dynamic risk management system 
can be developed for marine vessel so that it could be useful when moving through a 
narrow channel. It can be beneficial in terms of collision avoidance for a marine vessel 
in the narrow and busy water channel, port and berth area and narrow river channel. It 
can be effective by warning the operator of a vessel of a potential collision threat whilst 
travelling along a narrow trafficway. The proposed dynamic risk-based model is 
implemented through a case scenario of a narrow river channel to see the potential 
benefits of the model. In the proposed model, if a real-time observation is provided 
such as vessel kinematics (approximate distance between the vessels, own vessel 
speed, and manoeuvring condition, target vessel type, length and speed), different 
operational and environmental state (navigation state, environment and weather state) 
as well as human factor state, then it may be possible to predict the level of risk and 
take effective action in real-time. Once the new information is added to the system of 
the moving vessel, the system will continue to update any risk of collision. 
4.1.1.   Literature review on existing collision avoidance technology 
Several methods have been applied to estimate the accident causation probability in 
maritime risk and consequence assessment. Among ship accidents, ship-ship collision 
has been the focus of many related studies in recent years (Goerlandt et al., 2015; 
Goerlandt et al., 2012a; Montewka et al., 2011a; Montewka et al., 2012; Montewka et 
al., 2011b; Montewka et al., 2010; Qu et al., 2011). Fujii et al. (1970) and Macduff 
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(1974) used the concept of collision diameter which is defined as the contact of two 
vessels at a distance (Pedersen, 1995). Gluver and Olsen (1998) utilised ship domain 
approach to assess ship to fixed object collision. Fowler and Sørgård (2000) used the 
critical situation criteria which is defined as a close encounter of two vessels within a 
certain distance. Tran et al. (2002) developed a unified collision avoidance system for 
a marine operation called MANTIS. Kaneko (2002) proposed a collision model to 
encounter probability estimation which is defined as a critical area in rectangular and 
circular shape around a vessel where a violation of that area means a collision. 
Pedersen (2002) published a series of papers based on collision assessment of a ship 
with a fixed object. Montewka et al. (2010) proposed the MDTC (Minimum Distance 
To Collision) geometrical model for the ship to ship collision probability estimation. 
Mou et al. (2010) established a risk assessment model and used the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) data to study collision avoidance in busy waterways by 
taking into consideration ship collision data. Qu et al. (2011) studied ship collision 
risks in the Singapore Strait by considering real-time ship location and vessel speed. 
Montewka et al. (2011a) defined a critical situation as the close encounter of two 
vessels within a distance of 0.5 Nm and considered this value as constant regardless of 
any contact between those two vessels. The Airborne Collision Avoidance System 
(ACAS) has been already introduced in (Baldauf et al., 2014; Baldauf et al., 2015) for 
the maritime domain. Further this method was extended as Maritime Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System (MTCAS) in (Baldauf et al., 2017; Denker et al., 2016). 
According to Baldauf et al. (2017), to trigger a perfect collision alarm a comprehensive 
network of sensors to provide accurate and reliable data of own vessel, marine 
environment and targets in the vicinity was greatly needed. Szlapczynski and 
Szlapczynska (2017) presented a Collision Threat Parameters Area (CTPA) display 
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based technique featuring a manoeuvre simulation mode to assist the navigator in 
advance to see the results of a planned manoeuvre (combinations of own course and 
speed with respect to time as well as target-colliding and landmass-colliding). 
Szlapczynski and Krata (2018) further extended the method by utilising detailed 
modelling of own ship dynamics viz. course alteration manoeuvres and supports 
navigation for harsh weather conditions. For other collision models, see Merrick et al. 
(2003), Goerlandt and Kujala (2011), Montewka et al. (2011b), Goerlandt et al. 
(2012a) and Goerlandt et al. (2015).   
4.1.2.   Discussion of existing accident models 
Most of the studies discussed above focused on a collision model for open waters. 
Several authors have considered ship safety domain and collision diameter as a safe 
distance to avoid contact with other vessels. AIS data has been used to study the 
collision avoidance. Automatic Radar Plotting AIDS (ARPA), a computer assisted 
radar data processing system is introduced to provide ship course, speed, range, and 
closest point of approach (NIMA, 2001). Integration of both ARPA and AIS with 
Electronic Charts (EC) (Weintrit, 2009) has resulted the concept of e-navigation. 
However, use of a sensor on a ship hull similar to RADAR system, such as that used 
in the automotive industry to locate a stationary and non-stationary object in near 
proximity and act in real-time, is comparatively an updated approach in the marine 
industry. The proposed decision-making skills in each step of estimated risk have never 
before been considered in a collision avoidance system. Conventional models 
developed for collision avoidance system uses fault tree, event tree and Bayesian 
Network (BN). However, use of Object-Oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN) in 
marine collision avoidance system is a relatively new concept. In this study, OOBNs 
are favoured over conventional methods due to advantages such as distinct subclass 
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for a complex network, encapsulated subnetwork for individual analysis of root causes, 
and addition/subtraction of new nodes without modifying the entire network. 
Additionally, features of BN include conditional dependency between root causes and 
consequences, common cause issues between the connected nodes, the addition of new 
accident prior probability as well as updating the real-time posterior probability in the 
model. The advantage of the proposed method is its capability to predict the level of 
risk considering ship kinematics, environmental and operational factors, as well as 
human factors. The estimated risk provides early warning to take appropriate 
mitigative measures in conjunction with decision-making skills to avoid collision in 
advance which enhances overall reliability of the shipping operations.        
 
The present study aims to develop a novel methodology by using the OOBN to 
represent potential collision scenarios in the narrow channel or port areas considering 
vessel kinematics, different operational and environmental factors as well as human 
factors to quantify the level of risk. Using OOBNs, the probabilities of different level 
of risk in narrow channels are quantified based on primary causes and their associated 
probabilities. The proposed methodology relies on historical data and past literature 
reviews in the estimation of the probability distributions of primary events. The 
primary objective is to mitigate the collision risk to be as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP). Different collision scenarios that are likely to occur during transit in narrow 
channels are studied. Two different case studies, which exemplify the application of 
the developed methodology, are also presented. 
 
This paper is structured in four main sections: Section 4.2 discusses the OOBN briefly 
and Section 4.3 explains the concept, methodology and collision scenarios. This is 
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followed by two case studies on risk estimation and a brief discussion in Section 4.4. 
The analysis of the results is discussed in Section 4.4 while concluding remarks are 
discussed in Section 4.5. 
4.2.   Object-Oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN) 
The BN is referred to as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), consisting of nodes and links 
connecting the nodes (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Pearl, 1988). The nodes represent 
discrete and/or continuous random variables, and directed arcs imply local conditional 
dependencies between parent and child nodes (Ghahramani, 1998; Jensen and Nielsen, 
2007; Neapolitan, 2003; Pearl, 1988). Each node is associated with its probability 
distribution which is marginal for nodes having no incoming arcs and is conditional 
for the other nodes. Although BNs have widely been used successfully in many 
disciplines, they are inadequate when modelling large complex domains (Koller and 
Pfeffer, 1997). The OOBNs can overcome such complex model domains and the use 
of OOBN enables the construction of complex and dynamic models (Koller and 
Pfeffer, 1997). 
 
The OOBNs are an extension of classical BNs which possess all advantages of classic 
Bayesian networks and contain instance nodes in addition to the classical nodes. An 
instance node represents an instance of another network, which could in itself contain 
instance nodes. An instance node is an abstraction of a network fragment into a single 
unit (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Koller and Pfeffer, 1997). The main advantage of the 
object-oriented approach is the ability to define object classes that inherit the properties 
of other classes. A class is a generic network encapsulation; however when this class 
is instantiated it is called an object. A class may be instantiated many times in a model 
(Jensen and Nielsen, 2007) and may share common subclasses. These subclasses can 
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inherit common properties from the parent class which can be modified and enhanced. 
An advantageous characteristic of object-oriented modelling is to create subclasses that 
inherit properties from another class (Koller and Pfeffer, 1997). 
 
A complex object comprises a set of attributes, and each attribute represents an object. 
Each of these objects is composed of input, encapsulated, and output nodes. An input 
node contains basic variables; however, encapsulated and output nodes are referred to 
as simple objects. A sample OOBN is presented in Figure 4–1. 
 
Driver
Age       License type       Accident history       Type of driver
Car
Age       Market value Insurance 
excess
Parking area
Insurance premium
(b)
Insurance 
excess
Parking area
Insurance premium
(a)
Learner
Car value
 
Figure 4–1: (a) A typical BN of car insurance premium for a learner. (b) OOBN model of car 
insurance premium for all type of drivers. 
 
4.3.   Proposed methodology for vessel collision alert in the confined 
area 
In the following sections, a natural framework for maritime risk analysis in a narrow 
channel is discussed in detail. A flowchart of the proposed model is shown in Figure 
4–2 to ensure a step-by-step systematic process. 
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Figure 4–2: Developed risk-based methodology for risk analysis in a confined area for an 
accident scenario. 
 
4.3.1.   Risk factors in the confined area 
Maintaining at least a minimum safe distance from the nearest object considering 
environmental and operational conditions is the biggest challenge for marine vessels. 
Risk factors such as navigational state (e.g., effectiveness of rudder, bow thruster, 
mechanical device, sensors, location detection, weather update, and communication), 
and environmental obstacles (e.g., current, fog, wind, wave, luminous background and 
seasonal effect) may play a crucial role in the ship to stationary/non-stationary object 
collision. Vessel safety is very important in terms of maintaining speed in a confined 
area in addition to  effectiveness of manoeuvring devices (bow thruster, rudder and 
machinery), location detection devices (echo sounder, GPS, RADAR, AIS, ARPA and 
ECDIS), communication devices (VHF radio and satellite antennae), weather update 
devices (NAVTEX, VHF radio, satellite broadcast, current indicator and weather 
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facsimile) and hull sensor. Shipping companies follow a standard safety checklist to 
ensure all statutory regulations comply with destination port requirements before 
arrival.  It is necessary to check all mechanical issues before entering the port area. In 
terms of any mechanical failure, it could cause disruption en-route and to the flow of 
traffic in the port area.   
 
Large vessels such as cargo carriers, passenger carriers, fishing vessels and oil tankers 
are of different sizes and weights. These types of vessels can maintain a stable speed 
in an open sea; however, it is challenging to maintain the same steadiness in a narrow 
channel or port area. When a vessel enters the port area with a stable speed, its course 
becomes difficult in the presence of cross-winds and cross-currents as both interfere 
with the maneuverability of the vessel. Furthermore, the presence of large vessels in a 
narrow channel may cause vessel induced waves which may result in a change to the 
water flow and thus to the currents. However, in the presence of two large vessels in a 
narrow channel, pressure is developed from both sides of both vessels which tends to 
divert both vessels from their pathway (Kray, 1973). According to PIANC (1980), at 
least twice the beam of the larger ship is required as a safe distance between large 
vessels in a two-way channel. Vessel length is important to measure safe distances on 
port and starboard sides of a vessel on any route. A comparison of typical cargo and 
passenger vessel dimensions adopted from Tsinker (1997) are illustrated in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1: Typical cargo and passenger vessel dimensions  
Tonnage Length 
(m) 
Width 
(m) 
Depth 
(m) 
Fully 
Loaded 
Draft 
(m) 
Displacement 
(t) 
Cargo Boats 
700 52 8.3 3.8 3.6 900 
4000 100 14.3 7.7 6.3 5300 
7000 124 17.0 9.6 7.5 9300 
10000 142 19.0 11.1 8.3 13300 
20000 184 23.6 14.6 10.3 26700 
Passenger Boats 
500 50 8.2 4.5 4.0 500 
4000 105 14.8 8.0 6.3 4000 
8000 135 18.2 10.8 8.0 8000 
20000 180 23.0 13.8 9.0 20000 
80000 290 36.0 21.0 11.7 80000 
Ore Carriers 
1000 61 8.9 4.8 3.3 1300 
4000 96 13.9 7.5 6.1 5300 
20000 164 23.4 12.7 9.2 26700 
50000 222 31.4 17.1 11.7 66700 
100000 278 39.3 21.4 14.0 133300 
Tankers 
300 37 7.0 3.3 3.0 400 
4000 96 14.0 7.2 6.2 5300 
20000 164 23.7 12.3 9.5 26700 
50000 222 32.0 16.7 12.2 66700 
120000 297 42.6 22.4 15.5 160000 
 
Environmental factors such as fog, heavy wind, high wave, luminous background and 
current may affect the operation of the moving vessel. Fog reduces visibility and can 
effectively hamper vessel movements. Luminous background at sea or in the port area 
may affect usual visibility. There are two types of fog; summer and winter. The wind 
is considered to be the primary cause of waves. Wind movement may affect marine 
vessel operations while entering and departing the port area, and during manoeuvering 
in port and confined areas. The wind effect can cause the marine vessel to oscillate, 
and sufficient wind can drift the vessel sideways or at an angle. A cross-wind has the 
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greatest effects on a vessel while sailing at low speed, particularly large vessels sailing 
with large areas exposed to the wind. Wind effects on marine operations including 
marine vessels and port facilities are adopted from Myers et al. (1969) and illustrated 
in Figure 4–2. 
Table 4-2: Wind effects on marine operations. 
 Effect on marine operations 
Beaufort scale Wind speed 
(knots) 
Marine 
Vessels 
Port  
Facilities 
0 Calm 0-1   
1 Light air 1-3   
2 Light breeze 4-6   
3 Gentle breeze 7-10   
4 Moderate breeze 11-16   
5 Fresh breeze 17-21 ↑  
6 Strong breeze 22-27 Berthing limit ↑ 
   ↓ Crane operations 
cease ↓ 
7 Near gale 28-33 Tugboat limit ↑ 
8 Fresh gale 34-40 Ferry operations 
cease 
Loading arms 
disconnected 
9 Strong gale 41-47 Emergency 
mooring lines 
↓ 
10 Whole gale 48-55 Larger vessels 
put to sea 
Facilities secured, 
cranes lashed, etc. 
11 Storm 56-63   
12 Hurricane 64-71   
 
Ship motion is greatly influenced when the frequency of the wave encounter with the 
natural frequency of the ship (Tsinker, 1997). According to (PIANC, 1980, 1985), only 
long-period waves (greater than 9 s or periods in excess of 16 min) need to be 
addressed for large ships if considering an increase in draft of ships due to wave 
response. Shorter waves significantly have no effects on natural frequency of large 
ships. On the contrary, open ocean long-period waves known as seiches may cause 
substantial damage to both ship and mooring structures. When a ship enters enclosed 
harbours, long period waves may be further amplified, and natural water oscillation 
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may develop. Two different types of waves such as short period (3 to 30s) and long 
period or seiche (period in excess of 16 mins) are considered during vessel navigation 
(Tsinker, 1997). Additionally, large waves known as vessel induced waves can be 
generated due to the movement of large vessels and can be classified as bow waves, 
transverse stern waves, and secondary waves. These waves follow the same 
mechanism as for wind waves and are highly dependent on vessel speed, hull shape, 
water depth, and the block-age ratio of the vessel to channel cross section (Tsinker, 
1997; Tsinker, 2004). In a confined waterway, the magnitude of the transverse stern 
wave is comparatively higher than the bow wave. Drift forces caused by the wave may 
have a significant influence on vessel maneuverability though it may not have enough 
impact when sailing on a straight course (Delft-Hydraulics-Laboratory, 1984). 
Different types of vessels such as cabin cruiser, tugboat, barge and tanker and their 
approximate generated wave heights, have been adopted from Sorenson (1973) and are 
illustrated in Table 4-3. 
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Table 4-3: Different vessel generated wave heights. 
 Distance from Sailing Line (m) 
 
Vessel type 
Length 
(m) 
Beam 
(m) 
Draft 
(m) 
Displacement 
(kg) 
Water depth 
(m) 
Speed 
(m/s) 
30.5 
Hmax (m) 
152.4 
Hmax (m) 
304.8 
Hmax (m) 
Cabin  
cruiser 
7.0 2.5 0.5 2722 12.2 3.1 
5.1 
0.2 
0.4 
0.1 
0.2 
 
Tugboat 13.7 4.0 1.8 26309 11.3 3.1 0.2 0.1  
 5.1 0.5 0.3  
Barge 80.2 16.8 4.3 4917000 12.8 5.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 
Moore dry 
dock tanker 
153.6 20.1 8.5 17.1E06 17.1 7.2 
9.3 
 0.5 
1.6 
0.3 
1.4 
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Currents influence vessel movement and may change the wave characteristics while 
on course. An opposing current may decrease the wavelength and increase the height 
of the wave. The tidal currents generally change four times a day which can have a 
profound effect on vessels approaching the port and while moored at the berth. 
Additionally, cross-currents may affect the vessel navigation. In some ports, vessel 
navigation is restricted during the tidal cycle or current windows due to strong current. 
Lack of knowledge on adverse environmental conditions and timely weather forecasts 
may result in uncertainties in ship manoeuvrability while navigating through the 
channel.  
 
Human error effect on detection failure is recognised as one of the recurrent causal 
factors for vessel collision. Human error and visibility are identified as significant 
contributors to marine ship collisions (Fowler and Sørgård, 2000; Macrae, 2009; Van 
Dorp et al., 2001). Rothblum et al. (2002) stated that about 80% or more of such 
accidents involve human-related error factors. Some of the most common human-
related errors such as interpretation failure, fatigue/sleeplessness, alcohol abuse, lack 
of technical knowledge of ship systems, and poor communication are examples  (2002; 
Dhillon, 2007; Talley, 2002; Uğurlu et al., 2015). According to an investigation into a 
typical number of collision cases, a major lack of situational awareness is identified as 
a major cause (Liu and Wu, 2004). NTSB (1981) recommends improving internal 
communication between shipmates and crew members, masters to pilots, and other 
communication such as ship to ship, and ship to VTS on board. Experienced 
shipmasters or ship pilots can react promptly to a stressful situation. One of the main 
tasks of bridge officers is to maintain safe navigation during voyage planning. 
Misunderstandings between shipmasters and the bridge personnel can lead to a 
107 
 
possible collision or grounding. If crews are unable to maintain a safety level in the 
sequence of events leading to a collision, it is often concluded as a case of incomplete 
or incorrect execution of tasks (Baldauf et al., 2017). While manoeuvering large ships 
in confined areas (e.g. port, narrow channel) or in busy traffic, knowledge of particular 
areas is essential along with experience for accurate and safe maneuvering.  
 
Potential risk factors for ship to stationary/non-stationary object collision in a port area 
are illustrated in Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4: Risk factors associated with ship to stationary/non-stationary object collision. 
OOBN classes Risk factors 
Human factor 
state 
Interpretation failure 
Fatigue 
Poor watchkeeping 
Individual failures 
Lack of communication between vessels 
Lack of communication between master and pilot 
Lack of communication in bridge team 
management 
Onboard communication failures 
Lack of emergency awareness 
Inexperienced sailor 
Navigational 
and 
manoeuvring 
equipment 
state  
Rudder failure 
Machinery failure 
Bow thruster failure 
Manoeuvring device failure 
Inactivated ECDIS 
Sensor failure 
Echo sounder failure 
GPS failure 
Navigational equipment failure 
Tug failure 
Low visibility Fog effect 
Bad weather 
Luminous background 
Environment 
state 
High wind 
High wave 
Vessel induced wave 
Strong current 
 Own vessel speed 
Target vessel distance 
Target vessel speed 
Target vessel length (m) 
Target vessel type 
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4.3.2.   OOBN construction for risk factors 
The following classes comprise the OOBN model: (a) human factor state, (b) 
navigational and manoeuvring equipment state, (c) low visibility, and (d) environment 
state. Other risk factors such as own vessel speed and manoeuvring condition, target 
vessel distance, target vessel type, length and speed are also added as important factors 
in the OOBN model. Different vessels such as cargo carriers, oil tankers, LNG/LPG 
carriers, passenger carriers and fishing vessels differ in length, speed and carrying 
capacity. Ship to stationary/non-stationary object collision consequences are reflected 
through the integration of the above classes in the OOBN. The output from each class 
is connected to other nodes or consequences. Table 4-4 explains the dependency 
among the OOBN nodes in the proposed model. 
4.3.3.   Human factor state 
Collision avoidance is one of the most important tasks for the watchkeeper on a ship’s 
bridge (Baldauf et al., 2017). The shipmaster is responsible for critical decision making 
in case of emergency for the safety of vessels, crews and the environment. A crew 
should possess adequate technical knowledge of their own ship and be aware of safety 
measures in a crisis. Shipmasters and officers should be fully aware of the limitations 
of the vessel and maintain a safe distance from any object while en-route. In terms of 
unacceptable risk, shipmasters need to take action. Considering the factors “Individual 
failures”, “Onboard communication failures”, “Inexperienced sailor” and “Lack of 
emergency awareness”, Figure 4–3 shows a small BN of the “Human factor failure” 
model. The internal node “Human factor failure” is dependent on the inputs of 
Individual failures, Onboard communication failures, Inexperienced sailor and Lack 
of emergency awareness. The output node, “Human factor failure”, is a Boolean node 
with possible values of “Yes” and “No”.  
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Onboard 
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communication 
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pilot
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communication in  
bridge team 
management
 
Figure 4–3: OOBN for Human factor failure. 
 
4.3.4.   Navigational and manoeuvring equipment state 
The effectiveness of bow thruster and rudder are important for safe maneuverability in 
the port area. In addition to the above devices, tug assistance also contributes to safe 
navigation. Any mechanical or navigational issues could interrupt steadiness of the 
vessel in a confined area or open sea. In Figure 4–4, the OOBN model uses the internal 
node “Manoeuvring device failure” as a dependent node on the three input nodes: 
Rudder failure, Machinery failure, and Bow thruster failure. The internal node, 
“Navigational equipment failure”, also depends on the four input nodes of Inactivated 
ECDIS, Sensor failure, Echo-sounder failure and GPS failure. Therefore, 
“Navigational and manoeuvring equipment failures” is also dependent on another set 
of inputs defined by the nodes “Manoeuvring device failure”, “Navigational equipment 
failure”, and “Tug failure” (Figure 4–4). These internal nodes also influence the output 
node “Navigational and manoeuvring equipment failures”. The output node, 
“Navigational and manoeuvring equipment failures”, is a Boolean node that shows 
“Fail” and “Work” as the two outcomes.  
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Figure 4–4: OOBN for Navigational and manoeuvring equipment failures. 
 
4.3.5.   Low visibility 
The node “Low visibility” is dependent on fog effect, bad weather and luminous 
background. Two different types of fog, such as Summer and Winter, influence the 
Fog effect and are highly dependent on Season. In Figure 4–5, OOBN model of the 
low visibility state is illustrated. 
Bad 
weather
Low 
visibility
Fog effect
Luminous 
background
 
Figure 4–5: OOBN for Low visibility state. 
 
4.3.6.   Environment state 
Environmental factors such as high wind, high wave and strong current may affect 
navigation. In Figure 4–6, OOBN model of the environment state is illustrated. High 
wave (including swell) is dependent on high wind and vessel induced wave. The wind 
effect is considered as the primary cause of waves. The strong current can deviate the 
vessel from actual speed. The output node “Environment state” becomes dependent on 
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the node “High wave” and “Strong current” in the model. The output node 
“Environment state” shows Boolean values “Yes” and “No” as the outcome.  
High wave
Vessel 
induced wave
Environment 
state
High wind
Strong 
current
 
Figure 4–6: OOBN for Environment state. 
 
4.3.7.   Decision-making skills 
Decision making is appropriate whenever ships need to manoeuvre and pass at a safe 
distance in typical situations. To take necessary steps upon a warning, in every step 
each individual need some required skills. In an emergency, these skills might differ 
based on different conditions such as open water, busy traffic, extreme weather and 
external attack (piracy or terrorist attack). In this study the following decision-making 
skills are proposed (Figure 4–7): 
 
1. General skill requirement (GSR): General skills gained during initial training 
on shore and/or on board the ship through the training requirement outlined in 
the IMO’s international convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping (STCW) for Seafarers, in its 1995 revised version as amended 
for basic navigational technique skills. 
 
2. Management training requirement (MTR): Management training obtained 
through higher training and onboard work experience to be skilled in bridge 
resource management and bridge teamwork. 
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3. Technical knowledge requirement (TKR): Technical knowledge gained 
through academic knowledge outlined in STCW 95 as amended and exposure 
to onboard navigational equipment to make the best use of those navigational 
aids in any situation. 
 
4. Emergency skill requirement: Emergency response responsibilities and 
situational awareness has to be gained by every mariner through the pre-sea 
course, academic course and onboard drill and training as per SOLAS, 
MARPOL and STCW. 
 
5. Sailing experience requirement (SER): Sailing experience is gained through 
mandatory sailing requirement outlined in STCW 95 as amended for keeping 
continuity or career progress by securing higher ranks as well as shipping 
industry requirements for employment and promotion. 
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Figure 4–7: MCAR decision-making skills. 
 
General skill and management training are essential in every step to cope with the 
situation (e.g., from situation assessment to evasive action). Any wrong decision by 
the shipmaster can be a failure to take appropriate action to avoid a collision. The 
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decision-making process should be supported by appropriate warning in time. As 
illustrated in Fig. 7 the decision-making process consists of four elements: “Situation 
assessment”, “Appropriate action”, “Immediate action” and “Evasive action”. In an 
emergency when the first warning is activated, it is necessary to assess the situation 
(internal and external) for further decisions. At this step, general skills and 
management training of the crew and shipmaster are necessary. If for any reason the 
situation assessment is not properly evaluated then a second warning will be activated 
which requires technical knowledge along with general skills and training to allow 
appropriate action. Immediate action is needed once the third warning is enabled which 
involves emergency response skills along with general skills and training. If there is a 
failure to act on previous warnings, the last and final warning will be activated for 
evasive action which requires sailing experience along with general skills and training. 
The prior probabilities of these decision-making skills are calculated using evidence 
from previous literature (Baksh et al., 2015; Rathnayaka et al., 2011; Rathnayaka et 
al., 2013), past experience and expert judgment (Table 4-5). 
Table 4-5: Prior failure probability of each decision-making skill. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.8.   Collision alert and decision-making 
In a narrow channel or confined area, vessel movements can occur in the same 
direction, opposite direction or at an angle (viz. 90º between vessels). The safe distance 
between two queuing ships in a  port area depends on the ships’ sizes, that is; (i) 1 
nautical mile (nm) in between (over 20,000 g.r.t), (ii) 0.5 nm in between (500 g.r.t ~ 
Safety barrier(xi) Failure probability P(xi) 
General skill requirement (GSR) 2.90×10-3 
Management training requirement (MTR) 4.21×10-2 
Technical knowledge requirement (TKR) 5.27×10-2 
Emergency skill requirement (ESR) 2.71×10-2 
Sailing experience requirement (SER) 10.88×10-2 
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20,000 g.r.t), and (iii) 4 times a ship’s length for ships under 500 g.r.t (Hsu, 2014). 
According to IMO  (Nautical-Institute, 2013), the safe distance (Figure 4–8) to comply 
with collision regulations is as follows:  
• Port side of any route: 6 ship lengths + 500 m 
• Starboard side of any route: 0.3 nautical mile (nm) + 6 ship lengths + 500 m 
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Figure 4–8: Safe distance on port and starboard side of a vessel on any route according to IMO (Nautical-Institute, 2013). 
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For example, two vessels are heading in the same direction (Figure 4–9) in the port 
area, and the distance between them is about 3000 m. If the host vessel is 160 m in 
length, then the required safe distance to manoeuvre is on port side, (6 × 160) + 500 = 
1460 m and on starboard side, 0.3 nm (555.6 m) + (6 × 160) + 500 = 2015.6 m. 
However, 1 nm (1852 m) is recommended by the port traffic control for vessels moving 
in a line, under same speed forward, and with similar headings (Hsu, 2014). So, the 
remaining distance before the minimum safe distance starts is 3000 – 1852 =1148 m. 
The proposed collision alert system will use the hull sensor to check the safe distance 
frequently and hence alert the shipmaster in real-time. If the total distance between 
vessels, D = 3000 m and safe distance for vessels moving in a line, under same speed 
forward, and with similar headings, dsafe = 1852 m then remaining distance, dmin = 1148 
m. It can be expressed as, D = dmin + dsafe. The remaining distance, dmin can be divided 
in four parts as, x1 = ¼ dmin, x2 = ½ dmin, x3 = ¾ dmin and x4 = dmin.   
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Figure 4–9: The distance between vessels in the port area moving in the same direction under same speed. 
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The “Warning” node has five states, (i) first alarm, (ii) second alarm, (iii) third alarm, 
(iv) final alarm, and (v) no alarm. It is assumed that the host vessel is approaching at 
medium speed with reasonable manoeuvrability. The likelihood of first alarm is 
increased when the host vessel embraces one-fourth of dmin which is considered as very 
far. The second alarm is activated when the vessel crosses half of dmin which distance 
is considered as far, and the third alarm is activated when vessel crosses one-third of 
dmin which is considered as close. The final alarm is activated when vessel crosses dmin 
which is considered as very close and requires evasive action. No alarm is kept as an 
option, when the risk is extremely low. The shipmaster is therefore being notified 
through the different states of the alarm to keep the minimum safe distance on the port, 
starboard and bow side.  
 
The four “Decision making” nodes are dependent on “Warning”, and Decision-making 
skills (GSR, MTR, TKR, ESR and SER). In an emergency, the decision of a shipmaster 
is critical. The “Warning” node is dependent on “Navigational state”, “Weather and 
environment state”, “Own vessel speed”, “Target vessel distance”, and “Own vessel 
manoeuvrability”. The “Own vessel manoeuvrability” node is dependent on “Target 
vessel type”, “Target vessel length (m)”, and “Target vessel speed”. The input node 
“Target vessel distance” has four states: very far, far, close and very close. Similarly, 
“Own vessel speed” and “Target vessel speed” have three states: low, medium and 
high. “Target vessel type” has four states: cargo, tanker, passenger and fishing and 
“Own vessel manoeuvrability” has three states as reasonable, tight and extremely tight. 
The outputs of preceding OOBNs (e.g., human factor state, navigational and 
manoeuvring state, visibility state and environment state), as well as other nodes (e.g., 
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own vessel speed, target vessel distance, and own vessel manoeuvrability), are taken 
into consideration in the proposed model (Figure 4–10). 
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Figure 4–10: OOBN model for the confined area. 
 
The model in Figure 4–10 explicitly combines all the preceding OOBNs to form a 
larger model for collision alert and decision making at a different stage of vessel 
navigation from a very far distance to very close distance. 
4.3.9.   OOBN model update 
The proposed method takes advantage of case scenario data and updating mechanisms 
to reassess the risk regarding new information. In Bayesian updating approach, new 
information is employed in the form of likelihood functions to update prior 
probabilities using Bayes’ theorem (Kanes et al., 2017; Kelly, 2011; Meel and Seider, 
2006). Although the time slice is not considered in the proposed model, the 
observations (e.g., new evidence) however, can be a function of time. In Figure 4–10, 
all the individual OOBNs and the individual linked nodes are illustrated. The prior 
probabilities in the OOBNs, as well as in the individual nodes, are updated 
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continuously as new information becomes available, as illustrated in Figure 4–10. The 
internal nodes “Human factor state”, “Navigational and manoeuvring state”, 
“Visibility state”, and “Environment state” are kept encapsulated. In these 
encapsulated nodes, any new nodes can be added, or existing nodes can be subtracted 
without affecting the entire network. The “Decision” node will update itself when the 
prior probability is updated in the model. The complete BN for the MCAR system is 
illustrated in Figure 4–11.  
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Figure 4–11: The complete MCAR model for the confined area.  
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4.4.   Application of the collision alert model: case studies 
The application of the proposed method is applied in two generic case studies, (i) a 
bulk carrier navigating through Malacca-Singapore Straits, and (ii) a cargo ship 
navigating the north-western coast of Oo Shima towards Takuma port. The detailed 
scenarios are analysed using the OOBN as shown in Figure 4–11 which is the complete 
version of Figure 4–10. The prior probabilities are assigned based on literature reviews 
and expert judgment. In the following sections, the application of the proposed 
methodology is applied to a case study of a large vessel navigating through the 
confined area. 
4.4.1.   Case study 1: Bulk carrier navigating through Singapore-Malacca Straits 
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are considered to be a major gateway for trade 
between the Far East, the oil-rich states in the Middle East and ports along the way 
(Qu and Meng, 2012). An estimated 200 vessels pass through the straits on a daily 
basis, carrying almost 80% of the oil transported to Northeast Asia (Gilmartin, 2008). 
The high-volume traffic coupled with the narrow passage makes the Straits challenging 
for mariners. The Straits are about 2.8 km wide along with 2.1 km long shipping 
waterways at Phillips Channel (Qu and Meng, 2012). The region experiences frequent 
rain, windstorms and fog and, strong currents can be experienced during the transit 
through the Straits (StrasseLink, 2014). Low visibility due to fog makes it difficult for 
mariners to navigate through the Straits. Human error, such as fatigue and intense 
stress, also contributes to navigational hazards in the Straits (Zaman et al., 2015). The 
Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s Market Association (LMA) declared the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore to be on the list of high-risk areas in June 2005 (Wu 
and Zou, 2009). The geographical view of Straits of Malacca and Singapore, adopted 
from SAFETY4SEA (2014), is illustrated in Figure 4–12. 
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Figure 4–12: Geographical view of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 
 
In this case study, a bulk carrier is assumed to navigate through Singapore-Malacca 
Straits. It follows a route from the South China Sea to Singapore Strait then Malacca 
Strait to the Indian Ocean. However, a large oil tanker (222 m long) is sailing in the 
same direction preceding the bulk carrier. In this study, the bulk carrier is assumed to 
proceed with medium speed, and the distance between the vessels is about 1.5 nautical 
miles. It is almost the end of summer and some early storms result in low visibility in 
the Straits. The bulk carrier’s shipmaster is fully aware of the situation, and there are 
no mechanical issues so far on the vessel. The oil tanker is passing through the narrow 
Phillips Channel at 05:30 hours and experiencing some unsteadiness due to strong 
current, and low visibility is affecting normal operation. Due to low visibility, the 
bridge master on the bulk carrier failed to locate the oil tanker. However, a first 
warning is shown on the dashboard when the bulk carrier passed one-fourth of the 
minimum distance before the safe distance starts. The shipmaster ignored the warning 
as no indication was given from the bridge. As soon as the bulk carrier entered the 
narrow Phillips Channel, the crew heard one long blast on a horn. The bulk carrier was 
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too close to alter course and collided on the starboard side of the oil tanker at 06:15 
hours.    
 
Based on the above scenario, the probability assessment scenario was carried out using 
four different times in the selected area, as shown in Figure 4–13. In this case, the 
scenarios have been taken at local times 05:15, 05:30, 05:45 and 06:00 hours. Response 
for each risk factor associated with bulk carrier navigation in the Singapore-Malacca 
Straits is recorded and demonstrated in Table 4-6. The BN simulation of the model is 
shown in Figure 4–14. The result of the probability assessment is classified in Table 
4-7. 
0515 060005450530
 
Figure 4–13: Forward collision in the Phillips Channel. 
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Table 4-6: Response to risk factors associated with bulk carrier navigation in Singapore-Malacca Straits. 
OOBN 
classes 
Risk factors Time,  
0515 hrs 
Time,  
0530 hrs 
Time, 
0545 hrs 
Time, 
0600 hrs 
Human factor 
state 
Interpretation failure no no no no 
Fatigue no no no no 
Poor watchkeeping yes yes yes yes 
Lack of communication between vessels no no no no 
Lack of communication between master and pilot no no no no 
Lack of communication in bridge team management no no no no 
Lack of emergency awareness no no no no 
Inexperienced sailor no no no no 
Navigational 
and 
manoeuvring 
equipment 
state  
Rudder failure no no no no 
Machinery failure no no no no 
Bow thruster failure no no no no 
Inactivated ECDIS no no no no 
Sensor failure no no no no 
Echo sounder failure no no no no 
GPS failure no no no no 
Tug failure no no no no 
Low visibility 
state 
Fog effect yes yes yes yes 
Bad weather yes yes yes yes 
Luminous background no no no no 
Environment 
state 
High wind no no no no 
Strong current yes yes yes yes 
 Own vessel speed medium medium medium medium 
Target vessel distance very far far close very close 
Target vessel speed medium medium medium medium 
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Figure 4–14: BN simulation results of bulk carrier navigating through Malacca-Singapore Straits at 0600 hours. 
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Table 4-7: Model outcome based on available information on the four-time step (case study 1). 
 Time (hours) 
 0515 0530 0545 0600 
 Bulk carrier 
 D: Very far 
S: Medium 
D: Far 
S: Medium 
D: Close 
S: Medium 
D: Very close 
S: Medium 
1st warning (%) 92.96 7.04 0.10 0.10 
2nd warning (%) 0.00 92.96 6.94 0.20 
3rd warning (%) 0.00 0.00 92.96 6.74 
4th warning (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.96 
No warning (%) 7.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Situation 
assessment (%) 
92.81 7.02 0.10 0.10 
Appropriate 
action (%) 
0.43 89.78 6.70 0.19 
Immediate action 
(%) 
2.08 0.46 90.89 6.59 
Evasive action 
(%) 
2.17 2.36 1.45 90.87 
*D – Distance (Target vessel), S – Speed (Own vessel) 
 
Based on the model outcome shown in Table 4-7, the first warning is given around 
05:15 local time for situation assessment when the distance was very far between two 
vessels. However, no assessment is done to locate any surrounding vessels or 
environmental obstacles but rather the same speed has been maintained which has 
resulted in the second warning at 05:30 hours. Again, appropriate action is not taken 
(e.g., lack of technical knowledge) and hence, the third warning is activated at 05:45 
which requires immediate action. At 05:30, the course and the speed of the oil tanker 
deviated against a strong current in low visibility as it passes through the narrow 
Straits. The shipmaster of the bulk carrier failed to take immediate action such as 
manoeuvring and controlling the astern propulsion which has resulted in a final 
warning. At 06:00 hrs the oil tanker has almost passed through the Straits as well as 
the harsh environment. However, the bulk carrier passed the safe distance domain and 
failed to manoeuvre due to close distance, and as a result, collision occurred. Table 4-7 
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shows a clear-view of the risk level, and as the level of risk increases the probability 
of warning level also increases. Similarly, lower risk decreases as the situation crosses 
that threshold. 
4.4.2.   Case study 2: Collision scenario between a cargo ship and a recreational 
fishing vessel 
In this section, a collision scenario between a cargo ship and a recreational fishing 
vessel is studied to demonstrate the application of the proposed MCAR collision alert 
model. This case study is adopted from the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) 
website (JTSB, 2011). The characteristics of port areas differ and are unique when 
compared to open waters. Therefore, particular factors such as wind and wave effect, 
current effect, safe distance, and any mechanical issues might have a significant 
influence on the risk associated with vessel’s navigation in the port areas. Estimated 
vessel tracking from Keihin port to Takuma port is illustrated in Figure 4–15.  
 
A cargo vessel (vessel A) departed from Keihin port around 07:00 hrs local time and 
is heading toward Takuma port (south-westward). The vessel is sailing at a speed of 
approximately 11.5 knots under hazy conditions with a number of recreational fishing 
vessels spotted in the area. Two radars and GPS have confirmed vessel location. The 
master of the cargo vessel is engaged in organising the vessel’s chart as no vessels are 
visible by way of visual lookout. From the bridge, the chief cargo engineer notices the 
mast of a fishing vessel (vessel B, 45 m in length) moving in the bow direction, and 
then turns and immediately informs the cargo vessel master. At the same time, a 
passenger seated on the port side of the aft section of the fishing vessel informs the 
skipper about the cargo vessel. The skipper looks in the bow direction and notices the 
cargo vessel approaching approximately 45º ahead to port, and immediately engages 
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the engine to full astern. The master of the cargo vessel immediately engages the clutch 
to astern as soon as the fishing vessel becomes visible. Around 1100 hrs, the bow of 
the cargo vessel sways the starboard side of the fishing vessel. During the incident, the 
weather was cloudy and hazy with light and dark areas (low visibility 2-5 m). The 
ocean current and tide were moving at a speed of approximately 0.5 – 1.2 knots from 
north-eastward to eastward.  
Estimated Vessel Track
Location
(Around 11:00, June 12, 2011)
Izu Ooshima Lighthouse
 
Figure 4–15: Estimated vessel track heading towards Takuma post from Keihin port. 
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Based on the information provided in the scenario, the collision scenario was carried 
out using four different times in the selected area, as shown in Figure 4–16. In this 
case, the scenarios are taken at local times 10:15, 10:30, 10:45 and 11:00 hours. 
Response for each risk factor associated with the cargo carrier navigating the north-
western coast of Oo Shima is recorded and demonstrated in Table 4-8. The BN 
simulation of the developed model is shown in Figure 4–17. The result of the 
probability assessment is shown in Table 4-9. 
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Figure 4–16: Forward collision between cargo and fishing vessel on the north-western coast of Oo Shima. 
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Table 4-8: Response to risk factors associated with cargo ship navigation near Oo Shima. 
OOBN 
classes 
Risk factors Time,  
1015 hrs 
Time,  
1030 hrs 
Time, 
1045 hrs 
Time, 
1100 hrs 
Human factor 
state 
Interpretation failure no no no no 
Fatigue no no no no 
Poor watchkeeping yes yes yes yes 
Lack of communication between vessels no no yes yes 
Lack of communication between master and pilot yes yes yes yes 
Lack of communication in bridge team management yes yes yes yes 
Lack of emergency awareness yes yes yes yes 
Inexperienced sailor yes yes yes yes 
Navigational 
and 
manoeuvring 
equipment 
state  
Rudder failure no no no no 
Machinery failure no no no no 
Bow thruster failure no no no no 
Inactivated ECDIS no no no no 
Sensor failure no no no no 
Echo sounder failure no no no no 
GPS failure no no no no 
Tug failure no no no no 
Low visibility 
state 
Fog effect yes yes yes yes 
Bad weather yes yes yes yes 
Luminous background no no no no 
Environment 
state 
High wind no no no no 
Strong current yes yes yes yes 
 Own vessel speed medium medium medium medium 
Target vessel distance very far far close very close 
Target vessel speed medium medium medium medium 
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Figure 4–17: BN simulation results of a cargo ship navigating the north-western coast of Oo Shima at 1100 hours. 
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Table 4-9: Model outcome based on available information on the four-time step (case study 2). 
 Time (hours) 
 1015 1030 1045 1100 
 Cargo carrier 
 D: Very far 
S: Medium 
D: Far 
S: Medium 
D: Close 
S: Medium 
D: Very close 
S: Medium 
1st warning (%) 94.17 5.83 0.10 0.10 
2nd warning (%) 0.00 94.17 5.73 0.20 
3rd warning (%) 0.00 0.00 94.17 5.53 
4th warning (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.17 
No warning (%) 5.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Situation 
assessment (%) 
94.02 5.82 0.10 0.10 
Appropriate 
action (%) 
0.43 90.95 5.53 0.19 
Immediate 
action (%) 
2.11 0.43 92.07 5.40 
Evasive action 
(%) 
2.20 2.36 1.44 92.03 
*D – Distance (Target vessel), S – Speed (Own vessel) 
 
Based on the model outcome shown in Table 4-9, the first warning was given around 
10:15 local time for situation assessment when the angle distance was very far between 
two vessels. The master of the cargo carrier was relying on visual operation rather than 
using radar or other devices whilst organising the vessel chart. No assessment was 
done after the first warning to understand the situation of surrounding vessels to ensure 
safety. This resulted in a second warning at 10:30 hours. Due to lack of technical 
knowledge and skills, appropriate action was not taken and hence, the third warning, 
which required immediate action, was activated at 10:45. Due to lack of emergency 
skills and low visibility, the master of the cargo carrier failed to take immediate action 
such as manoeuvring immediately and control astern propulsion which resulted in a 
final warning. At 11:00 hrs the cargo carrier passed safe distance domain and failed to 
manoeuvre due to close distance. As a result, the collision occurred, and significant 
damage was done to the fishing vessel. Table 4-9 shows the increasing level of risk as 
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the probability of warning level increases and the lower risk decreases as the situation 
crosses that threshold. 
 
The above analysis reveals that the proposed OOBN methodology allows estimation 
of the different level of risk during navigation in a confined area or narrow channel 
under certain conditions. Different environmental and operational conditions as well 
as human factors that can affect the navigation, are identified and considered as 
primary causes. By applying prior probabilities to these primary causes or risk factors 
in the developed model, it is plausible to determine the level of risk and act 
accordingly. Each subclass can be integrated into a single network to see the possible 
outcome. An additional risk factor can be added or subtracted from each subclass 
without modifying the entire network which is considered to be an advantage of the 
OOBN. 
4.5.   Conclusion 
A conceptual model, MCAR, based on OOBN methodology is proposed to estimate 
the level of risk and real-time decision making under certain conditions in the presence 
of stationary and non-stationary objects in a narrow channel and confined area. By 
taking advantage of the OOBN, a large network was encapsulated with different 
subclasses that could be easily modified without affecting the entire network. It can be 
useful to identify the root cause of each subclass and analyse each individually. The 
applicability of the proposed methodology has been demonstrated through two case 
scenarios in a confined area or narrow channel; a bulk carrier navigating through 
Malacca-Singapore Straits, and a cargo ship navigating the north-western coast of Oo 
Shima. This model estimates the level of risk by taking into consideration vessel 
kinematics, different operational and environmental factors as well as human factors 
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in a confined area and provides early warning. Five decision-making skills such as 
general skill, management training, technical knowledge, emergency skill and sailing 
experience are employed as a requirement in an emergency. The probability obtained 
through the proposed methodology can be used to make a real-time decision, such as 
situation assessment, appropriate and immediate action, followed by evasive action. 
The simulated result shows the increasing level of risk as the probability of warning 
level increases. Similarly, lower risk decreases as the situation crosses that threshold. 
The developed methodology can be used in a confined area or narrow channel to 
investigate the possibility of preventing and mitigating vessel collision to stationary or 
non-stationary objects. 
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Chapter 5:   Conclusions, 
Recommendations and Further Work 
 
This chapter presents the main conclusions of this research and a number of 
recommendations for further work. 
5.1.   Conclusions  
The aim of this thesis is to develop an advanced probabilistic model for accident 
modelling in marine and offshore operations. In chapters 2 and 3, the model 
development is focused on Bayesian Network (BN). In the last section of the study, 
Object-Oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN) is utilised to model and integrate a 
distinct subclass. OOBN framework is selected due to its capability to control 
encapsulated subnetworks for individual analysis of root causes, and 
addition/subtraction of new nodes without modifying the entire network. Each specific 
task has been included in each chapter with details. 
 
On the basis of the reported findings in this thesis, the following main conclusions can 
be drawn: 
 
• A review of existing scenario-based modelling approaches reveals ignoring 
evolving scenarios in modelling of accident scenarios. Hence, a network based 
model is developed to envisage the most probable accident scenarios in 
complex offshore process facilities. By using BN, conditional dependency has 
been illustrated between the primary causes and the consequences through 
direct causal arcs. The posterior likelihood of consequences has been estimated 
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using prior data. In addition, the prior probability has been updated considering 
the evidence of specific consequences. The application of the proposed model 
has been demonstrated on two specific case studies, viz. ammonia and LNG 
release on process facility. Five different accident scenarios are shortlisted for 
the ammonia release study. Consequences such as toxic release, Boiling Liquid 
Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) and vapour cloud explosion (VCE) 
were identified. For the LNG release study, four different accident scenarios 
are shortlisted. Fire and explosion consequences such as pool fire, jet fire and 
VCE were identified. Using the Maximum Credible Accident Scenarios 
(MCAS) method, damages such as fatalities, financial and the environmental 
loss as are estimated for above scenarios as well as the credible values for 
individual fire and explosion and toxic release consequences. For the ammonia 
release study, the final credible value of BLEVE has been estimated to 0.47 in 
terms of fire and explosion. For the toxic release event, the final credible value 
of toxic release event has been estimated to 1.0, 1.0, 0.86, 0.01 and 0.61 
respectively. A higher fatalities and environmental loss are observed due to a 
toxic release in scenario 1 and 2. However, a higher degree of financial loss is 
also observed in scenario 3 due to a BLEVE. In terms of fire and explosion, 
scenario 3 is the most credible. In terms of toxic release, scenario 1, 2 and 3 are 
the most credible. Overall, scenario 3 is the most credible in terms of combined 
effect of fire and explosion and toxic release. For the LNG release study, the 
final credible value of pool fire, VCE and jet fire has been estimated to 0.31, 
0.63 and 0.14 respectively. Due to instantaneous release of LNG in scenario 2, 
higher degree of financial loss and fatalities are observed for VCE. Hence, 
scenario 2 is the most credible in terms of fire and explosion. For the ammonia 
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release study, the high pressure and sudden expansion inside the vessel had the 
most effect on BLEVE in terms of scenario 3. In scenario 1, 2 and 5, a 
pressurised release of ammonia gives rise to a two-phase discharge which may 
result in toxic effect in absence of ignition source. For the LNG release study, 
the unpressurised condition had more effect on pool fire in comparison to the 
VCE and jet fire. In terms of liquid release, VCE and jet fire is more influenced. 
However, in terms of dispersion, dense cloud has more effect on VCE. The 
developed concept model can be applicable to the other offshore process 
facilities. 
 
• The existing transportation accident models consider individual events and 
independent causation factors that may particularly lead to the accidents on the 
NSR. This study focuses on developing a dynamic risk-based model to analyse 
shipping accidents in the Arctic waters. Application of the developed 
methodology is reliant on Bayesian Network modelling and takes the 
advantages of case-specific data and updating mechanisms to reassess the risk. 
In the developed model, ship collisions with ice during navigation in Arctic 
routes were considered. However, accident scenarios, such as foundering, and 
grounding were also considered due to the likelihood of their taking place. The 
risk analysis revealed that the East Siberian Sea had the highest probabilities 
regarding collision, foundering and grounding of the ship. Other regions such 
as Chukchi, Laptev, Kara and the Barents Sea have almost similar probabilities 
regarding grounding. However, foundering probabilities are very low in all five 
areas. The sensitivity analysis of collision, foundering and grounding events 
also revealed that the developed model was sensitive to several environmental 
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and operational conditions. From the BN and subsequent sensitivity analysis, 
it is clear that some of the root nodes are the dominant factors towards the 
accidental event. This contribution is the highest for collision and foundering 
where an increase of the initial probability leads to a significant change in the 
probability of the occurrence of accidental events. In the cases of grounding, 
this effect is less significant. The developed approach can be helpful for 
decision makers and safety experts to estimate the probability of different types 
of marine ship accidents considering the factors most contributing to the 
existing environmental and operational conditions. The developed 
methodology can be used to investigate the possibility of preventing and 
mitigating ship accidents in harsh and cold environments. 
 
• A conceptual model, MCAR, based on OOBN methodology is proposed to 
estimate the level of risk and real-time decision making under certain 
conditions in the presence of stationary and non-stationary objects in a narrow 
channel and confined area. By taking advantage of the OOBN, a large network 
was encapsulated with different subclasses that could be easily modified 
without affecting the entire network. It can be useful to identify the root cause 
of each subclass and analyse each individually. The applicability of the 
proposed methodology has been demonstrated through two case scenarios in a 
confined area or narrow channel; a bulk carrier navigating through Malacca-
Singapore Straits, and a cargo ship navigating the north-western coast of Oo 
Shima. This model estimates the level of risk by taking into consideration 
vessel kinematics, different operational and environmental factors as well as 
human factors in a confined area and provides early warning. Five decision-
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making skills such as general skill, management training, technical knowledge, 
emergency skill and sailing experience are employed as a requirement in an 
emergency. The probability obtained through the proposed methodology can 
be used to make a real-time decision, such as situation assessment, appropriate 
and immediate action, followed by evasive action. The simulated result shows 
the increasing level of risk as the probability of warning level increases. 
Similarly, lower risk decreases as the situation crosses that threshold. The 
developed methodology can be used in a confined area or narrow channel to 
investigate the possibility of preventing and mitigating vessel collision to 
stationary or non-stationary objects.  
5.2.   Recommendations and Further Work 
There are several improvements that can be implemented in future work. I propose the 
following points for future research: 
 
• Uncertainty analysis: Uncertainty assessment needs to be considered in the 
developed models. There are various uncertainties associated with the models 
and the considered factors. Considering these uncertainties within the model 
will increase the confidence and accuracy of the final results received in 
accident modelling and consequence analysis.    
 
• Proximity sensor: Use of proximity sensor in collision avoidance system has 
been available in the auto industry for a long time. The marine industry can 
also use similar close proximity sensor on ships and boats during navigation 
which can be useful for crew members. 
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• Head-up display: Most of the modern auto vehicles in autonomous/non-
autonomous category have quickly adopted head-up display features as has the 
aviation industry. Marine vessels can also be equipped with head up display, 
and facilitate the most up to date features. 
 
• Expert elicitation: Expert elicitation plays an important role in BN 
construction, quantification and validation. We can use their expertise and 
reuse previously elicited information which would be a valuable contribution 
to the BN modelling. 
 
• Other approaches: The Bayesian Network framework developed in this thesis 
can be compared to other probabilistic tools and machine learning algorithms. 
It would be interesting and beneficial to investigate the new technique. 
 
• Operating condition: The operating condition in harsh environment needs to 
be studied.  Cold operating environment are often supported with very limited 
navigational support during ship operation. Ship operations in ice and severe 
sub-zero temperatures may expose ship operators and crews to unique risks and 
considerations. Hence, IMO regulations, procedures and recommendations for 
ships operating in cold and harsh environments need to ensue.  
 
• Study of natural hazards: Natural hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, 
cyclones and storms/wave surges are naturally occurring physical phenomena 
which are caused either by rapid or slow onset events. It is therefore important 
to study the impact of such natural hazards.  
143 
 
 Appendix A 
An application of BN to envisage potential accidents in FLNG facility 
This conference paper was presented at the 12th International Offshore and Polar 
Engineering (ISOPE) Pacific/Asia Offshore Mechanics Symposium (PACOMS-2016) 
in Gold Coast, Brisbane, Australia. The citation for this paper is: 
 
Baksh, MA and Abbassi, R and Garaniya, V and Khan, F, “An application of BN to 
envisage potential accidents in FLNG facility”, Proceedings of the 12th ISOPE 
Pacific/Asia Offshore Mechanics Symposium (PACOMS) 2016, 4-7 October 2016, 
Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia, pp. 297-304. ISSN 1946-004X (2016). 
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